I owe you an apology for my long silence & especially as I have two letters of yours unanswered. My Cirt. did not end until the latter part of June, & I have ever since been overwhelmed with pressing private or public concerns, which have obliged me to postpone all other business. In addition to my other labours I have been obliged to prepare a Discourse to be delivered this month before a Literary society (the P. B. K.) of which I am President; & this has cost me much time & anxiety, for my Hearers will be critics of a good deal of fastidiousness.

I have received numerous Letters on the subject of the Clerkship vacant by the Death of Mr Griffith, many of which are of the highest respectability. Many of them were received before your Letter respecting Mr Herbert— To all I have answered briefly that no appointment can be made until the next term of the Court; & that I shall leave myself open to consider the merits of all the Candidates at that time— I have no candidate, whom I am obliged to favour from private friendship; & you may be assured that your wishes in favour of Mr Herbert will have great weight with me, although I am sure, that you, as well as myself, will be embarassed by the character of some the applicants.

I have examined all your cases attentively, & of one or two, which are in print, I have read the opinions at large. In all of them, except one, I fully & entirely concur. I was particularly gratified with your opinion in Copeland v. Bousquet, because it coincides with some views of the subject, which I was lately called upon to consider, though not to decide. I wish you could have decided otherwise in Kirkpatrick v. White; but I cannot See that it was possible upon authority— The only case I doubt about, & that is only a doubt, is McFarlane vs. Griffith— I agree that the rule in equity is as you state it; but my difficulty is whether the principle of the Pennsylvania law does not furnish an exception to the application— That principle is that the assignee shall be deemed in the same predicament, & liable to the same equities, as the obligee— I understand your answer; & that the rule looks only to the Law; & that the Cirt Courts in Equity are to be governed by the general principles of Equity & not by local rules— Still I feel some doubt, whether this principle, though true in general, is not as to rights liable to exception. I should be glad to read your opinion at large.

The business of my Circuit was longer than usual; but owing to accidental circumstances little was done—Owing to Mr Webster's absence, the death of Mr Blake's wife, & the extreme illness of the wife of another distinguished Counsellor, very little business was done in Boston— The mass has been postponed to the autumnal Cirt.

In Maine & Rhode Island considerable business was done; but nearly all the causes turned upon questions of fact; & the few questions of law, which arose were continued for advisement, so that there is scarcely any thing to report to you. I will however state one or two.

1. Prescott vs. Nevers. Trespass quare clausum &c. The following points were decided. 1. Where a person enters into possession of land under a recorded deed claiming title to the Entirety conveyed by the Deed, & exercises rights of ownership, it is a disseisin of all persons who claim title to the same land. 2. One tenant in common may diszeize another. And if a person enter into possession of land under a deed, claiming title to the entirety, & the title turns out to be defective as to a moiety, & thereby other persons are in law Tenants in common, yet such possession & claim of the Entirety is a disseisin of the persons entitled to such moiety.

2. The Brig Mercator— Libel on the 28th section of the Collection Act of 1799. Ch. 128. against the ship for forfeiture for unlading goods &c. before arrival at the port of discharge— The only point made was whether knowledge of the unlading was to be brought home to the Master or Owner. The Court thought, that as the word "knowingly" was not in the section, there was no ground to insert such a qualification of the meaning of the section.

There is before me the question as to the legality of taking Bonds by the Postmaster General or his Deputy Postmasters: but as the question is before the Supreme Court, I have postponed the consideration of it.

You have not written to me whether yo<u> <mutilated> ever recieved the Quintal of fish which I s<ent> you last winter. Its nonarrival, while I was at Washington, surprized me. I hope however that it has come safe.

I have seen, how you have been annoyed by the visits at Mount Vernon. It is truly surprizing to me, that Members of Congress should affect ignorance of the rights & claims of private Gentlemen.

I rejoice much in the appointment of Judge Trimble, I shall be surprized, if he is not an essential aid to us— I do not know, what you thought, but I was grieved, that the Chief Justice's "Roanoke Friend" should have endeavoured to bring him into a debate in the Senate, as an active political partizan, or at least as an Enemy of the President. The Chief's good nature sometimes gets him in to difficulty.

You shall have a full & early account of my autumnal Circuit, as an atonement for my long delay. God bless, my dear sir, and grant that you may many years continue to be in our common comfort & support in the Court. yours affectionately