I was about to sit down to give you an account of my autumnal Circuit, when I had the pleasure of receiving your late letter— Before I say one word on this subject, I beg to apologize for not acknowleging before the barrel of hams which you sent me— The barrel of hams safely arrived at Boston, & there by the carelessness of the Captain or Consignee or both, it was left on the wharf for a day or two, & thus all were stolen except five— These I received & they were so good that I regretted extremely my loss—& am most truly thankful for your kindness— I sent you some time since by a Brig from Boston, whose name has now escaped me (Dart I think) a quintal of our own Fish— It was as good as any I have ever seen here, & if not "lost or missing" I believe you will join me in opinion.

I have examined the very interesting cases you have sent me with attention. They are very instructive— I do not know that there is a single point, in which, if I understand you rightly, I disagree with you; & in all the important points I am entirely ex animo with you.

The cases of Lonsdale v. Brown & Boudereau v. Montgomery I had previously read in the national Gazette— I am entirely satisfied that in the former you are right—And notwithstanding the great authority of the 11 Judges in the Berkley Peerage is against you in the latter, I confess myself strongly inclined to your side of the question. The doctrine or rather qualifn of the doctrine in the Berkley Peerage Case was new to me, & I read it without being convinced. I am therefore much inclined to be bold & stand by you as an auxiliary.

Phillips v. McCall though a hard case seems to me to be clear upon principles of law, & I know not how it could be disputed.

I am glad to find that you have had occasion in Denn. & Ridgeway v. Underwood to settle some of the great points under 13 & 27 Eliza. I have travelled through the decision on those Statutes for a different purpose; but my results have been like yours— Upon the 6th point as to whether fraud should not be directly found in all cases by the verdict, or it may be inferred by the Court, it appears to me, that in general fraud must be directly found by the verdict. But if certain facts are by the Statute or Common Law declared per se fraudulent, & necessarily & absolutely so, I do not see why a court may not properly in such a case (all the facts being found) draw the conclusion of Law— Constructive frauds, or presumptive frauds ought to be proved directly as such by the Jury— So I answer your Quere.

U.S. v. Frederickton— Clearly this case was within Sturgis v. Crowninshield— How many shifts to evade the Constitution?

I incline to go with you in U.S. v. Slaymaker— The case in 1. Taunt. 55 to the contrary gives no reasons, & is therefore unsatisfactory—But as the jurisprudence, where I live, gives rise to no questions of this sort, I am less at home than on others.

Read & Consequa & Isaacs v. Cooper—for injunctions— These are clear on authority & reason— I like Eden's Book on Injunctions & the late cases proceed upon better reason than the old cases— I had occasion lately to examine the Law as to injunctions for violations of patents, & was ready to rule, as you have ruled; but the case was abandoned.

I agree in Trask & Davis v. Duval— The Plfs. were entitled to recover on the express promise: but if the Jury negatived that, I think they were entitled to recover freight from Dft, as assignee of the Bill of Lading.

The case of Martin v. Bank of U.S. is, I believe, right— Formerly I had many Doubts on the Subject— But after reading the late decisions, and particularly Judge Drayton's, & yours, I have been a good deal shaken in any doubts, & should be excessively puzzled to get along on the other side— My only doubt was how far any party could recover upon secondary evidence, where he voluntarily cut his own security into parts, & thus multiplied the chances of its loss— But I believe I must surrender at discretion.

So ends my short comment upon your excellent text— And now I proceed to give you my List of decisions for the last circuit, which closed but a few days since. There was a considerable deal of business—more than for several years past.

1. U. States v. Schooner Fame. Libel for breach of revenue Laws— The principal question was, & it is of great practical importance, what is the true jurisdictional line between the U. States & Great Britain on the waters of Passamaquoddy Bay— This line has been twice settled by Conventions between the two Governments in exact conformity to the wishes & instructions of our Governt,¹ & twice Mr Jefferson in his wisdom saw fit to reject them for no earthly reason, that has yet appeared, & to the great inconvenience of both countries— The following points were held & practically (I believe) they coincide, in the result, with the doctrines held onto by the two Govts— 1. Where a river or a bay is the boundary between two States or Nations, if the original property is in neither & there is no convention respecting it, each holds to the middle of the stream or bay. 2. By the middle of the stream or bay is to be understood, the middle of the channel or main stream & not merely the middle of the waters at high water mark, for each nation has an exclusive right to the shore on its own side down to the lowest Ebb, & it is over the residue that the divided empire commences—the right usque ad filum aquae— 3. If notwithstanding such division the channel be such that the use of the whole is necessary to the convenient navigation of both nations to their respective territories, there will arise (in the absence of all other claims,) a presumption of a common right of user of the waters of the whole Channel for the purpose of such navigation. 4. Such a common right of users of the waters is not inconsistent with an exclusive jurisdiction of each nation to the middle of the channel, but is to be considered as an easement— 5. A seizing officer, as such, is not an incompetent witness in a Libel in rem for condemnation of the property, as forfeited.

2) U. States v. Hoar Administrator of Tuttle. Assumpsit for money had & received—Pleas—Plene Administravit— General Statute of Limitations of Massachusetts in personal actions— Statute of Limitations of Massachusetts respecting Executors & Admirs—Demurrer & Joinder—Upon the first plea the Argument turned principally on Local Law— Rested by the Court— 1 That neither of the Statutes of Limitations of Massa. nor of any State bound U. States in suits in the Courts of the U. States to recover their debts, & therefore such pleas were not a bar to such suits. 2. A general plene administravit is good when all the property of the Intestate has been exhausted in the regular course of administration— But if exhausted in payment of debts, where a priority debt is outstanding, the plea should aver that payment was made before notice of such priority debt, other wise it is bad.

3. The Ship Two Catherine's &c. Libel for mariners wages & for salvage. The Ship sailed from Newport on a voyage to Gibralter, & there landed her cargo—took specie on board to purchase a return cargo—went to Ivica in ballast to get the Cargo—took in there a Cargo of Salt—sailed for home—& in going into Narragansett Bay (near Newport, R. Island) was cast away, bilged & immediately sunk— All the Salt was lost. The mariners remained by the Ship for three days & until discharged by the underwriters, to whom she was abandoned— They exerted themselves a great deal & saved all the rigging, sails, cables, &c. more than sufficient to pay all their wages for the homeward voyage. The Ship was afterwards weighed & got up to Providence & repaired— The Seamen were paid their Wages up to the arrival in Gibralter & during half the stay there— The cause was ably insured— Plfs. contended 1. That the plfs. were entitled to wages up to Ivica & during half the stay there. 2 That Plfs. were also entitled to their wages for the homeward voyage, though the cargo lost, as more was saved of the materials of the ship, than sufft to pay them— 3. If not entitled to wages as such, Plfs. were entitled to salvage, the contract being dissolved by the Shipwreck— The Court held 1. That Plfs. were entitled to wages to Ivica & during half the time there (There is a hair's breadth difference between your decision & mine on this point, not material) 2. That as the cargo was lost & no freight earned on the homeward voyage, no wages were due to the mariners for the homeward voyage—3. That the Contract of the Seamen was not dis<mutilated> by the Shipwreck; but that they were bound to remain by the ship and save all they could—4. That under such circumstances, where under the contract they could not earn wages, they were entitled to salvage —5 The quantum of salvage is discretionary; but as the general rule had been adopted in foreign ordinances & decisions to allow them the wages of the homewd voyage as salvage, that shewed the sense of the commercial world in ordinary cases; & the Co. under all the circs. adopted it in this particular case, not as a general rule—but as a convenient estimate.

All the leading authorities at home & abroad were reviewed elaborately by the Court— There was another point raised upon which all the parties in interest requested a decision, & that was whether the sums so paid were to be ultimately a charge in the Ship owners or Underwriters. The Court held that the wages up to Ivica & the stay there were a charge on the Ship owners, & the Salvage allowed was a charge in the underwriters on the Ship—it being a lien on the materials saved.

4. Barker v. Marine Insurce Cy—Policy of Insurce— The principal question was whether the Plf. had an insurable interest in the property on board—under these circums.— The Plf. was master of the Ship, which put into Bristol in England in distress— he sold the ship, & set up the cargo for sale at Auction & bought it in, because it could not be sold without a sacrifice— It was then put on board another ship bound for U. States, consigned to the owners— The Insurance was on the cargo on account of the Plf.— The court held that there was no sale or transfer of the property so as to charge the title, & vest the property in the Plf.— That the cargo was bid in by the master, who could not at the same time <mutilated>—That, as master he had no insurable interest in the property—Verdict for Dfts.

5. U. States v. La Jeune Eugenie—Libel 1. for being engaged in the Slave Trade against our Acts of Congress. 2. as against the Laws of Nations generally— By the evidence it appeared that the vessel was documented as French—was American built & owned until within 2 years—sailed from Guadaloupe & was taken by one of our public Ships on the coast of Africa— The French owners claimed the property— The French Consul protested against the jurisdiction of the Court; & at the very Heels of the cause the American Govt interposed a suggestion offering to deliver up the vessel to the King of France; but to this the Owners objected— The cause was most elaborately argued on several points. 1. That this was an American vessel in disguise—2. That the Slave Trade to Africa was against the Laws on Nations & the Laws of America & France & therefore the Owners' Claim must be rejected—3. That if no legal Claim before the Court, she might be properly delivered up to the French Sovereign— I took time to deliberate & pronounced a very long opinion, trés recherché— It is now in press & I shall send it to you as soon as published— I held. 1. That if the only question before the Ct were the private ownership, farther proof ought to be admed—2. That the African Slave Trade was theoretically repugnant to the Law of Nations, & practically was so by the Laws of America & France—3. That under such circums. no claim founded on a violation of public Law could be sustained in a Court of Justice—4. That though in gen<eral> nations do not enforce the municipal laws of each other, yet as to subjects of their common interest & policy, & which each regards as a public crime, the Courts of each nation may justly refuse to enforce any claims founded on a violation of them—5. That the Claim of the French owners under these circs. must be rejected as founded in illegality & that the property might be delivered over to the King of France to enforce the forfeiture in his own Courts.

I dare say you will think me a bold Judge— Be it so, but I must ask your patience to read before you condemn me— I have Sir W. Scott against me; but I have Sir W. Grant in my favour, & the public declared Sense of the sovereigns of all Europe— You will find the opinion guarded & sober in all the ticklish points— I have not meddled at all with the question of the right of slavery in general; nor could I with any decent respect for the Institutions of my country deem it proper to engage in such speculations.

6. Harding &c. v. Handy. Bill in Equity by heirs at law to set aside a conveyance by Ancestor for fraud & imposition— The case is intricate in facts. The following points decided. 1. A court of equity has jurisdiction to entertain a suit upon the application of heirs to set aside a deed off land obtained from their ancestor by undue influence & mental incapacity, though he be not actually insane, & though there may be a remedy at Law? And the doctrine applies to a case, where one of the heirs, by the consent of the others, has taken a deed from such ancestor to prevent his being imposed upon by strangers, under a family arrangement, that the deed shall be considered as a trust for family purposes, to support the father, & on his death to divide the property according to Law among the heirs. 3. Under circumstances a conveyance may be allowed to stand security for actual advances & charges, though set aside for all other purposes, on account of imposition, or mental incapacity, short of insanity—See How v. Welden. 2 Ves. 516. Taylor v. Rochfort. 2 Ves. 281. Belts Supp[lemen]t to Vesey. 345. 396 &c. &c.— What say you to this last point? The case before me was a family arrangement, the father being very imbecile, & almost insane but the conveyance made to prevent his squandering his property, & the Grantee having supp<mutilated> him; but now, (against the truth of the case), claiming the property as bona fide purchased by Law, & denying any trust or mental imbecility.

7. U. States v. Spalding—Debt on a bond given on the exportation of goods for the debenture under Revenue Act of 2 March. 1799. ch. 128 § 78 &c. & particularly § 81. The bond was cancelled by the Collector at the Custom House upon the production of the Certificate required by law of the due landing of the goods in a foreign country. But the party procured this to be done by imposition upon the Collector, the certificate being wholly false & fraudulent— The decision stated the bond, making a present of it in its mutulated state, & averred the special facts, which occasioned its mutulation, & <mutilated> set forth the condition of the bond, (not making a second property of the condition). & averred a breach in the non production of the certificate required by law within the time prescribed— After oyer of the bond the Dfts demurred, & in joinder made the following objections 1. That there was no profert of the condition in the declaration, though it was set forth in the decision— 2. That no suit at Law can be maintained on a custom house bond, which has been mutulated by fraud & imposition practiced on a public officer by the party. The Court held 1. That if an obligee tear off the Seal or cancel a bond, in consequence of fraud & imperiation practised by the Obligor, he may declare on such bond as the deed of the obligor, & set forth in the profert the special facts, & such profert will be good— 2. That in such a case a Court of Law has concurrent jurisdiction with a court of equity to sustain a suit to enforce the Bond— 3. Where a profert is made of a bond & the declaration goes on to state the condition & to assign a breach, it is not necessary to make a seperate profert of the condition, for by the profert of the Bond in the first instance the whole is before the Court, & the party may have oyer of the obligatory part, or of the condition, or both, if he chooses to pray for it— 4. That a breach of the Bond given under this act, negativing in the terms of the condition the production of the certificate reqd by law, is a sufft allegation of breach.

8. Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Administrators: This cause, which was decided at the last term, came on again, leave having been given to amend the Bill, & the amendment stated that R. offered to give a mortgage, but by consulting counsel the p<art>ies were advised <mutilated> irrevocable letter of attorney was an equivalent security, & so took the latters. Demurrer to the amended bills. The Court held 1. That a court of equity may allow an amendment of a Bill after deciding against the Bill, & allowing a demurrer on argument. 2. That if a party takes a security for money, which is merely personal, instead of taking a mortgage on property under a mistake of law by all parties, that the power of attorney is as safe a security, as a mortgage, a court of equity will not relieve the party, who took the security, & substitute for it a lien or mortgage on the property.

9. U.S. for the Newport Bank. v. Rousmaniere's Administrators. Bill in Equity— The Newport Bank was the Bank, in which, Custom House Bonds are left for collection. R. had a bond becoming due in a few days, & procured the Bank to discount two notes signed by himself & indorsed by third persons, for the express purpose of paying the Bond. The proceeds of the notes were carried to the Credit of the U. States, & the bonds given up to R., as paid— It turned out, that the indorsements on the notes were forgeries committed by R. The bill was brought to give the Bank the same priority against R.'s estate (he having committed suicide) as if the Bonds were unpaid, upon the ground, that the payment was procured by fraud— The Court held that by the payment the Bond was discharged, & could not be set up in equity as a subsisting bond to give a priority to the Bank.

These are the most material cases, which I have decided If any of them strike you as of such difficulty, as to induce you to review the authorities on the subject, I will bring them with me, when I come to Washington, where I hope to have the pleasure of meeting you in a few weeks.

I read the attack upon you in the Southern newspapers respecting the Sale of your Slaves last summer, & was extremely disgusted both with the matter & the manner— As I found the subject attracted some notice here, (though I hope you do us the justice to believe we are not wild enough to embrace some of the fanatical doctrines on this subject) I took occasion to explain what I supposed to be the real facts; & I was very much gratified in finding from your printed letter, that I had not greatly mistaken them—Though in New England we are practically opposed to Slavery, yet it is a temperate opposition & readily admits the difficulties, which in a state of thought, where it already exists, must necessarily surrou<mutilated> There may be a few men among us ready to hazard <mutilated>ces, on this subject; but they are very few; & the <mutilated> opinion is the other way— I am sure your vindic<mutilated> the approbation of our most reflecting men.

I have read with no small indignation <mutilated>now Mr Jefferson's Letter to Mr Jarvis. H<mutilated> strong in death"; & seems ambitius in<mutilated>nalize his hostility to the Judiciary— A <mutilated>orable state of <mutilated> opinions w<mutilated> He is lending himself also to the wild & visionary <mutilated> of Virginia in their wishes to dissolve the union, <mutilated> Govt to a mere Confederacy— I take this to have <mutilated> & settled opinion—exploded by the better sense of for<mutilated> now revived to aid the judicial jealousy of so<mutilated> his native State— What will be the success of the <illegible><mutilated> now on foot to degrade the national Judiciary it is <mutilated> to foresee— that the real sober Sense of  the Country is aga<mutilated> I do not doubt; for if the national Judiciary is crippled, wh<mutilated> be the security per the Laws, for property, for personal liberty & rights, for the protection of creditors, & minorities in States? Yet demagogues so easily cloak their designs, that the real purpose is speciously concealed under false & hollow pretences of patriotism & republicanism; & <mutilated>& hated <mutilated> is<mutilated>—or (what is a watchword of potent efficacy) Zeal for <mutilated>— At present the public opinion in New England is right; & I think it will not be easily shaken; but after what we have seen, it will not surprize me, that by some "cunningly devised fable" we shall be ultimately thought to act against the Union, if the project shall not be stifled in its bud— Whatever may be its fate I am content to cling to the Constitution, as our only safe anchor of hope. If it perishes, it will leave me, I hope, young enough to earn my bread by some honest calling; & I shall mourn, not for my self, but for my fallen & ruined country—ruined, because fops in politics & visionary demagogues are permitted to usurp the places of the wise & virtuous & sober minds, which framed our Govt. God Bless you my dear Sir & believe me most affectionately your friend