I embrace the first moment of relief from more urgent business to perform my promise to report to you the substance of the decisions made during my last circuit which may be worthy of your notice.

Benner's admtr. vs. Fouckrod Execr of Holt. A Suit at law had formerly been brought by the Assignees of Benner, a bankrupt under the bankrupt law of the U.S. against the present deft to recover a pecuniary legacy devised by Holt to J.S. which was purchased by and assigned to Benner before his bankruptcy, but which legacy was dependent upon a contingency which did not happen until some time after the bankruptcy and assignment. In that suit a verdict and Judgt were rendered in favor of the plfs., the assignees, and the sum recovered was duly satisfied by the executor. The case now to be reported came on upon a bill in equity filed by the administrator of Benner agt the same executor to recover the same legacy, upon the ground that the legacy, depending upon a contingency at the time of the bankruptcy & assignment did not pass under the Assignment.

The Court admitted that the legacy did not pass by the assignment, and consequently that the assignees ought not to have recovered. But we decided that, independent of Benners knowledge of and acquiescence in that Judgt which were sufficient to destroy all pretence of equity agt the deft in this Suit, he ought not, upon general principles of law to recover—that a person who has once been compelled by the Judgt of a competent tribunal, 'tho an erroneous one, to pay a sum of mony to one man, cannot be called upon & compelled to pay it over again to the true owner of it, his conduct in defending the first suit having been in all respects fair & honest—that altho the right of the real owner is not barred by the first Judgt, he not having been party or privy to it, yet his remedy is agt the same deft—and that the mony so recovered in the first action is mony recieved to the use of the true owner which the latter may recover from the plf. in that Suit in an action for mony had & recieved. Cases referred to Le Chevalier Ass[ign]ee of Dormer vs. Lynch Doug. 170. Philips vs. Hunter 2 H. Blac. 402. Embree & Collins vs. Hanna 5 Johns. rep. 101.

Bradford vs. Geiss—Decided that it is a good exception to an answer in Ch[ancer]y, which denies that the deft had any knowledge of the facts charged in the bill, without adding that he had no information or belief of the facts 1 New. Chy 179.

Rogers vs. Abbot. Upon a motion for an injunction to restrain the deft from making and vending the plfs. patented improvement, the Court required the plf. to subjoin to his bill an affidavit of the truth of the same "and that he is, to the best of his knowledge & belief the true & original inventor and discoverer of the improvement for which he had obtained the patent, and that the same had not to his knowledge or belief been in use or been described in any publick work anterior to his said discovery."

The two last cases are noticed as cases of practice, which it is desirable should be as uniform as possible on the C. Courts & which can only be rendered so by communications amongst the Judges of what is done in the several Courts. It will enable us besides to correct such as may be found to be erroneous.

Young vs. Potts— The deft to an original bill filed his answer in Jany last, and having afterwards recd information of certain matters deemed material to the merits of the cause, he now filed a Cross bill seeking a discovery of those matters from the plf. in the original cause. The original cause having been set down for hearing, the Court refused to hear it until the Cross bill was answered. (another case of practice).

Lessee of Lanning vs. London— The declaration was upon a devise of 400 acres of land in D. County, surveyed under a warrant to H.W. adjoining land granted to D.S. at the trial of the cause, the plf. not being able to prove a title to the tract of land so described, a Juror was by consent of parties withdrawn, & the plf. now moved for leave to amend his declaration by inserting in lieu of the land described in it a different tract of land. The Court admitted that the amendment asked for was one of substance, it being to substitute an entirely new cause of action. But we decided that such amendments were clearly allowed by the 32d Sect. of the Judiciary Act which was intended to put an end to the difficulties constantly occurring in England as to what constitutes form & what substance. The Statutes admitting them in the former cases only. The first sentence of the 32d Sect. of the act of Congress is strictly an act of Jeofails applying solely to formal defects— The last is an act of amendments extending the power of the Courts to all defects substantial as well as formal, and to be exercised by imposing upon the applicant such terms as Justice may require. In this case, the Conditions prescribed were payt of torts—liberty to the deft to plead de novo & to avail himself at the trial of the act of limitations if he could do so, were he now served with the declaration in ejectment.

Corfield vs. Coryell— This was an action of trespass brought by the owner of a vessel belonging to plf., living in Philadelphia, against the defendant for seizing and selling her under a sentence of condemnation in N. Jersey in virtue of an act of that State which subjects to seizure and condemnation all vessels found taking oysters in the waters of that State which are not owned at the time by a Citizen of that State. The Court decided the following points—1. That this act was not repugnant to the 8th S. of the 1st Art. of the Constitution of the U.S. which vests in Congress the power to regulate Commerce—nor 2dly to the 2d S. of the 3d Art. which extends the Judicial power to all cases of admiralty & maritime Jurisdiction—nor 3dly to the 2d S. of the 4th Article which declares that "the Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges & immunities of Citizens in the several States.["] It was decided 4th that by the Charter of Ch. 2d to the Duke of York the province of N. Jersey was bounded on the West by the low water mark of Delaware bay & river but that up to the revolution that province claimed and exercised acts of possession & ownership as to navigation & the right of fishing more extensively & that the effect of the revolution was to confirm her title to the middle of the bay & river quo ad those rights & in subordination to the Constitution of the U.S.—5th The boundary of Cumberland County where the alleged trespass was committed being from a particular point on the bay "thence up the bay," it is bounded on the bay by the low water mark & consequently the deft (the magistrate who tried & condemned the vessel) had not Jurisdiction of the case, the seizure not having been made within the County to which his Jurisdiction was confined. But lastly, th<e> action of trespass cant be maintained by the plf. as the vessel at the time of the alleged trespass was in the possession of another person under a Contract of hiring then subsisting.

It would be difficult to abridge this case so as to lay before you the course of reasoning which was pursued, nor is it necessary as the points decided were deemed of sufficient importance by some of the bar to be published which it was I presume in Walsh's paper to which I must refer you.

You will percieve from the few cases reported that very little business was done during my later Circuits; this was occasioned by the Sickness of Mr Binny who was engaged in almost every cause.

I hope soon, my dear Sir, to recieve a letter communicating the decisions made during your circuit. Believe me to be with great regard your Affect. & ob. Servt