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To Smith Thompson

Dear Sir

I had a short session at Phila, and decided but few Cases, but most of these are interesting. Without further preface, I proceed to give you an abbreviated report of them.

1. Watson vs. Bladen. Action for the infringement of a patent to Treadwell for an improvt in forming & piercing bread, called a "Cracker finisher." The plf claimed as assignee quo ad Philada objected to the plfs right of recovery 1st that some of the parts of the machine, the original model of which was constructed by M., an ingenious mechanic, at the request of J. & from a drawing of his, were introduced into it upon the suggestions of M. 2d that J. was not the original inventor, it being proved that, many years prior to J.'s alleged invention, one C. constructed a machine for forming & piercing Crackers, having every essential part of J.'s, which was employed for an experiment in the bakery of C. & worked up part of a barrel of flour; but that after the experiment so made, it was found to answer no useful purpose, (being worked by the hand, instead of the lever power used by J.) and was thrown aside. 3d that J.'s patent includes all the essential parts of C.'s machine, and is therefore void. Charge 1st. It is essential for the Jury to ascertain, from the evidence, what parts of the machine were introduced upon the suggestion of M. because, if they were essential parts or principles, J. had no right to take a patent for them, & in that case, the whole patent would be void. But if they were mere alterations of J.'s discovery in form or proportion, for which M. could not have obtained a patent, it will not be sufficient to invalidate this patent. 2d upon this point, the plf.'s counsel insisted that the mere making of an experiment, tho in a public bakery, is not a using within the meaning of the 6th Sect. of the patent act. The Court charged otherwise, it being of no consequence whether it was used for that purpose, or for any other— it was used. 3d. If the Jury think that J.'s machine contains the principles & essential parts of C.'s, altho in a much more imperfect form, the patent is void, since it is for the whole. The plf. suffering a nonsuit after the charge, the objection to an action by an assignee of part of the patent, which had been reserved, was not decided.

2d. Ogle & Withoree vs. Ege. upon a bill filed by the plfs, the first, as the inventor and patentee, and the other, as his assignee quo ad Pennsyla., to injoin the deft from constructing &c. the thing patented within that state, the Court had, at a former Court, granted the injunction 'till answer or further order. With our filing an answer, the deft now moved to dissolve upon these grounds 1st that a patent cannot be partially assigned, and 2dly that the bill does not allege possession of the invention by the patentee cited 1 Mad. C. P. 137. Opinion— 1st whether a patent can be partially assigned or not, and if it can, how an action at law is to be brought, are questions unnecessary to be decided in this case, since there can be no doubt but that in equity, the patentee & his assignee in part may join in a bill praying an injunction and account. 2d the rule upon this subject is, that where the bill states a clear right to the thing patented, which together with the alleged infringement, are verified by affidavit, and the patentee has been in possession of the invention by having used or sold it, in whole or in part, the injunction is granted & contd till answer or further order, without sending the plf. to law. But if there be a reasonable doubt as to the plf.'s right, or as to the validity of the patent, the Court will require the plf. to try his right at law, and then return for an account. In this case, there was a sale of the invention by the plf. O. to the other plf. in part for a valuable consideration. motion denied.

3d. Copeland vs. Bousquet, Plf, a mercht of Boston, by order of B. of Phila bought of Amory in Boston 70 Casks of wine, when the following memorandum was made; "sold E. Copeland 70 Casks of wine at $1.10, 6 months, payble in Phila. or, if his principal prefers, Cash, 3 pr ct discount— acceptance to be perfectly satisfactory— Principal, B. of Phila." Of these terms B. was immediately informed by plf.— A. not being satisfied of B.'s solidity, refused to deliver the wine unless the terms of the sale were complied with; but afterwards, upon the importunity of C., he delivered it to him upon the express condition that he would cause to be produced a satisfactory acceptance, or cash, interest off, agreable to the terms of sale, to which effect he pledged his personal responsibility. The wine was then shipt by plf. to B. at his account & risk. B. refused to give a satisfactory acceptance, or to pay Cash, and, as a scarcity for mony borrowed of deft, and in discharge thereof, he sold the wine to him, and then assigned all his estate & effects to trustees for the benefit of his Creditors. The plf. being called upon by A. to perform his contract made on the delivery of the wine, paid for the same, and recieved a bill of parcels & transfer of it to himself. The plf. demanded the wine of the deft, who refusing to deliver it, this action, repleven, was brought. Decided 1st that the sale by A. to B. was conditional, so that the property in the wine was not charged from vendor to vendee 'till one or other of the Alternatives of sale was complied with, or unless the same was waived by an unconditional delivery; 2d the delivery in this case was conditional in its terms and in its spirit. 3d the deft stands in no better condition than B. from whom he purchased and as B. had no property in the wine, neither has the deft, and so Judgt must be for the plf. Cases Cited by the Court—1 Camp. 427. 3 S. & Row 20. 4 Massa. 405. 6 John. C.C. Haggarty vs. Palmer.

4th Kirkpatrick vs. White, Hazard, & the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co—Equity Bill by plf. a Citizen of N. Jersey agt the defts, alleged to be Citizens' of Pennsylva. praying discovery & relief as well agt the individual defts, as agt the company, an incorporated body. The defts filed a Joint and several plea to the Jurisdiction, alleging that 4 persons, naming them, members & corporators of the company were, when the suit was instituted, & still are, Citizens of N. Jersey & there residing. The cause was set down & heard on the plea. Decided 1st that where a suit is brought by or against a Corporation, in a Court of the U.S. if any of the corporators are Citizens of the same state with the plf. in the first case, or if a state other than that in which the suit is brought, in the second, the Court cannot hold Jurisdiction, if advantage be taken by plea, and consequently the court has not Jurisd. in this case as agt the corporation. The interest of the corporators in the franchises & property belonging to the Corpora. is Joint, & every member of it is, and necessarily must be, a party to the suit, being represented by the corporate name. 2d. tho the plea goes to the whole bill, still it may be good in part and not so as to the whole, and the Court will allow it as to so much of the bill as it is properly applicable, unless it contain the vice of duplicity. Altho the Court then cant take Jurisd. aft the Corpora. it can agt the individual defendants; against whom a seperate decree is prayed. Plea allowed with Costs as to the Corpora. & over vested as to the other defts who are to answer. Cases on 1st point 5 Cra. 57. 61. 3 Wheat. 591. 3 Cra. 267—1 Wheat. 91.

5th McFarlane vs. Griffith. Bill by a purchaser of land from J. W. to be relieved against his bond and mortgage given to secure the purchase mony, and to injoin deft the assignee of those instruments, from proceeding in an ejectment to recover the mortgaged premises. The equity stated in that J. W. had no title to the land. The answer alleges & relies upon, as if it was pleaded, that the deft. was the bona fide assignee of the bond & mortgage for a valuable consideration paid, without notice of any of the matters of equity stated in the bill. opinion—By a long & uniform course of decisions in this state, founded on two acts of assembly of 1705, it is established, that the Assignee of a bond or mortgage, tho for valuable consideration and without notice, stands in the place of the obligee or mortgagee, and is exposed to every legal or equitable defence which could be asserted against them. If then this were a suit at law, this Court would consider the law so settled, as binding on it under the 34th S. of the Judiciary Act. But this is a suit in equity, where a different rule of decision prevails, which is, that agt a bonafide purchaser, for valuable consideration paid, and without notice, that court will take no step whatever & grant no relief, but will leave the plf. to such remedy as he may have at law. By this rule we must be governed. Injunction dissolved & bill dismissed with Costs.

These are all the Cases decided which are worth reporting. It went very much against me to decide the Jurisdiction question as I did, on account of the Consequence, which will be to exclude almost all suits by or against corporations from the federal Courts. But there was no getting over the decisions of the Supreme Court, in all of which I heartily concur. quere, can congress by legislation afford a remedy? I am by no means clear as to this. I shall be impatient to know what you think of the above decisions & also to recieve a report on those made in your circuit. I am with great regard my dear sir your friend & affect. Servt

Bush. Washington

Source Note

ALS, ViMtvL: Historic Manuscript Collection.  The letter was postmarked in Alexandria on 11 May, and addressed to Thompson in New York.