At the time I recd your letter of the 7th July, I was engaged in completing some business which would not admit of delay, & as I wished to examine with attention, & a reference to books, the decisions you had given, I determined to postpone my answer until this could be done. In the mean time, our domestic misfortunes occurred, which compelled me to take my family to the mountains, where I remained until it was necessary to commence my circuit duty. This apology for my silence will, I am persuaded, be accepted.

Not having by me the old edition of the laws containing the bankrupt Act, I cannot speak confidently of the decision in the case of Lewis &c. vs. Sands, but I certainly had never supposed that the entire execution of that Act was vested in the District Court. I think the plea was properly overruled.

I also concur in the decision of the case of the U.S. vs. Noah, Sheriff. If admitting the prisoner to the gaol liberties wd not have amounted to an escape in the Sheriff under the laws of the State to whose gaol he was committed in case it had been under process from a Court of that State, I cannot percieve how, upon a fair construction of the resolution of Congress, the sheriff could be deemed liable where the commitment was under process from a Court of the U.S.

The Case of the U.S. vs. Lurt & Lurt admits, I think, of no doubt.

The correctness of the opinion in Gelston vs. Brewest upon the point that the law of the State directing the bill of exceptions to be argued before the writ of error is brought did not govern the practice of the Circuit Court, admits, I presume, of no question. The residue of that opinion involves, I think, more difficulty. I concur in it nevertheless upon the ground that as no Judgmen<t> had been entered, either party might move for a new trial under the general power given by the 15th Sect. of the Judiciary Act, at any time before Judgt, & if so, the facts stated in the bill of exceptions might properly be referred to for the grounds of the motion. I understand the 16th Sect. of the Act to relate to New trials after Judgment.

In the case of the U.S. vs. sundry articles of Merchandize I entirely agree with you upon authority, that the cross examination of a witness in chief, who is interested, is a wa[i]ver of all objection to his competency, if the fact of interest was known to the party. And in reason, for I can find no authority on the point, I should think that this consequence ought not to follow where it appears that the party cross examining was ignorant of the fact. Without dissenting absolutely from the residue of the opinion, I would suggest a doubt whether the 67th Sect. of the duty Act of 99 does not relate to a different subject from that embraced by the 22d Sect. of the Act of 1818—the former being confined, as it would seem, to a disagreement between the entry & the packages or their contents, and the latter, between the invoice & the packages or their contents? If this be the case, the latter cannot be construed to repeal the former. I would also make a query, whether a mere disagreement between the invoice & the entry creates a forfeiture under the above Section of the latter law? I have no decided opinion in these points, & doubt not that your opinion is right, altho I thought it not amiss to state these difficulties for consideration.

I concur with you throughout in the case of the U.S. vs. Brown. I have examined the cases referred to in Chitty 111, (except Roll. which I could not meet with in the office I visited this morning) and agree that they do not maintain the doctrine stated in the text. I do not recollect ever to have met with, in my practice, an action of covenant on a penal bond with a collateral condition, either on the obligatory part, or on the defeasance.

I agree also on all the points decided, & on the one not decided, in the case of Arredondo & Thomas vs. Ward. I have, after great consideration, decided, that unless the whole cause be removed, it cannot move at all from the State Court, as where the Circuit Court could entertain Jurisdiction as to some of the parties plffs, but not as to others. And as all the parties form but one in contemplation of law, the concurrence of all in the removal seems to be essential— I am with very great regard & respect my dear Sir very sincerely yrs