At length I have got sufficiently released from more urgent business to enable me to perform my promise to forward you a report of the cases which came before me on my late Circuit. I think I sent you from Phila. printed statements of¹ Pennock & Sellers vs. Dialogue & Courcier vs. Ritter— These will therefore be omitted from this letter.

<B>urton & wife vs. Smith admr W. E. Howel} Bill in equity— Upon the marriage of the plfs. the executors of Saml Howell, under<mutilated>en their testators will, assigned Certain bonds <mutilated> <mor>tgages to the intestate of the defts, in trust for the seperate use of the intended wife during her life &, after her death, over to other uses unnecessary to be stated. The following is the material clause in this deed of settlement "in trust that the said W. E. Howel his heirs &c. shall keep the said sums so secured out at the interest upon the securities afsd, or in case the same should be paid off, then upon other good land Security, and recieve the interest thereof due, and hereafter to grow due, & pay over the said interest when, & as the same shall become due, into the hands of the said Hannah" (the female plff) The trusts were accepted, & the deed was duly executed by the trustee. The securities were afterwards paid off, but the mony was not invested in other securities, but was used by the trustee, who died not leaving personal assets sufficient to pay his debts. The object of the bill is to charge the real estate of the intestate with this debt, & to compel the defts to invest the mony in good land security according to the deed of settlement. There were 2 questions—1st. whether this was a specialty debt, there being no express covenant by the trustee? 2d. Whether it was necessary to make the other Creditors of the intestate parties?

1. Decided that any words will be effectual to create a Covt which show the concurrence of the parties to the performance of a future act; in such a Case, Covt will lie, and equity will of course treat the obligation of the party as a specialty, if the deed be executed by him, tho there be no express substantive Covt on his part. 1 ch. Cas. 294 Hill vs. Car. 2 Bac. ab. tit. Covt A.—Lev. 274 Ray. 183—Sand. 319. 17 vez. 485 & 19th do 638 Ld Montfort vs. Cadogan. Cas. temp. Talb. 108 Gifford vs. Manley—6 Vin. 378 pl. 7. 1 P.W. 130—1 Atk. 88 Primrose vs. Bromly—1 Binn. 254 Frazer vs. Tunis. The Cases of Vernon vs. Vawdrey 2 Atk. 119 Cox. vs. Bacon 2 vez. 19 & 2 Mad. 132 apply to Cases where the trustee is no otherwise bound than by a parol acceptance of the trust, not to those where he has executed the deed. The other Cases are strictly applicable to the present to show that this was a specialty debt.

2. The other Creditors need not be made parties. The Admtr. is a trustee for & represents them. 1 Vez. 127 Peacock vs. Monk—1 Vez. 106 Newland vs. Champion. 2 Johns. C.C. 437. 2 Mad. Ch. prac. 152.

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U.S. vs. Ortega} Indict. for infracting the law of nations by an Assault committed on the person of Mr Salmon the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires. The following points of law were decided. 1st. The appointment of a chargé d'affairs by a foreign minister, upon his retiring from office, is usual, & sufficient to constitute the former a minister entitled to the protection of the law of nations. But whether a person be the legitimate representative of his sovereign or not, is a question of state, & not of Judicial enquiry. The constitution gives to the President the power to recieve Ambassadors &c. and necessarily bestows upon him the exclusive power to Judge of the credentials of those persons, & of their public character, & if he recieve and accredit them as Ministers, the other branches of the govt are bound to consider them as such & entitled to the protection afforded to such character by our laws & by the law of nations.

2. If a foreign Minister make the first assault, the return of a blow is no infraction of the law of Nations. 3. It is immaterial in this Case for the prosecutor to prove that the public character of the Minister was known to the deft.

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Sebring vs. Ward.} No compensation² being allowed in the Supreme Court of this State to the party for his travel & expenses, it cannot be taxed in the bill of Costs under the Act of Congress 1 March 1793 Sect. 4.

2d. Under the fair construction of the following Acts the successful party in a Civil Suit in the C.C. of the U.S. is entitled to have charged in the bill of Costs $1.25 for the daily attendance of his witnesses & 5 c. per mile for their travelling—Act of 28 feb. [17]99 Ing. dig. 389—3 Sect. Act. of 8 may [17]92 2d Bior. 300. 2 Sect. Act 1 June <mutilated> Bior. 568—6 & 9 Sect. Act of 28 feb. [17]99—3 Bior. 135.

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U.S. vs. Stevens} Ind<mutilated>ing the master & assaulting him with a dan<ge>rous w<eapon> <mutilated>h offence laid to have been committed on board a Ves<sel> belonging <to> Citizens of the U.S. on the high Seas in the outer road off the port of <St> Domingo. The proof was that the offences were committed on the inner road or port of St Domingo. Decided that unless the place is material to the essence or degree of the offence, a variance between that laid in the indictment, & that proved, is not material 1 Chit. Crim. law 241. That the place is immaterial as to both of the offences charged, it being of no consequence whether they be committed in port or on the high Seas, they are equally punishable by the former & late crime Act.

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Read vs. Bertrand³} Action of account render—plea that deft had fully accounted & issue thereon. The parties had entered into an agreement whereby deft bound himself to recieve from the plf. a large invoice of goods which he was to sell for him on a certain commission, and to return all such as he should not be able to sell at the invoice prices. The defendt sold a part of the goods and rendered to the plf. an Acct of sales & account current in which he debited himself with the whole of the goods at the invoice prices & credited himself with the Sales as far as he had made any, leaving a large balance. The residue of the goods were neither sold, nor returned, & this action was brought in the usual form. Decided that rendering the partial acct of Sales & account Current does not maintain the plea, which is that the deft had, fully accounted which could only be by rendering an account of the sales of all the goods, or of those & such as could not be sold and had been returned. 2d Upon the account Current which deft had rendered, the plf. could not bring insimul computassent, because that would be to make the deft the purchaser of the unsold goods against his will.

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U.S. vs. Snyder} Debt on the defts official bond as Collector of the internal taxes & duties. The demand was founded on a Statement from the treasury in which the deft is charged with all the uncollected bonds & duties due within his district. Before the deft was appointed to this office, his predecessor had under the general instructions issued by the Commissioner of the revenue to the different Collectors placed the collection of these bonds & duties in the hands of an attorney, there being no deputy of the district attorney within or convenient to his district. Decided that the deft is not liable for the amt of these bonds & duties. The Collectors are placed under the control & superintendance of the Commissioner of the revenue, and having by his directions placed the collection of those bonds & duties in the hands of an attorney for Suit, even the predecessor of the deft was liable only for the ordinary care & diligence of an agent, much less is the deft answerable beyond this, the business having been placed beyond his reach before he came into office.

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Lawrence vs. Schuylkill Navigation Co.} In this Case the following points were decided. 1. That a receipt in full is not conclusive, but is merely prima facie evidence of what it purports. 2d That if proof be given that it was unfairly obtained, or that the party who gave it acted under a mistake of facts, or of his legal rights, it is open to examination & correction of any error which may be proved as resulting from such mistake. 3. If the claim of the person who gave the rect was honestly contested, and a compromised agreed on, both parties are bound.

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Tiernan vs. Andrews} The deft a mercht of Bourdeaux gave to J.A. a power of attorney, appointing him his general agent in the U.S. with a letter of introduction to the plf. giving him the same information & requesting his services when they might be necessary. By orders of deft J.A. soon after his arrival in Baltimore sold to B.C. an imperial license belonging to deft and entered into a contract with B.C. respecting the same in his own name to which he affixed his own Signature & Seal, tho it was known by B.C. that the agreement was for the benefit of deft. In consequence of some disagreement between deft & B.C. growing out of this Contract, B.C. brought an action of Covt agt J.A. for whom the plf. became bait, and afterwards surety in a Supersedeas bond, which subjected him finally <mutilated>ty of paying the damages recovered by B.C. in his action. This suit was brought to recover back this mony as so much paid for the use of the deft and at his request. Decided that the debt recovered by B.C. agt J.A. being admitted to be the debt of the deft and the plf. having brought himself into the predicament of being obliged to pay it in consequence of his Suretiship entered into at the request of the defts agent, it was mony paid at the request of the deft as well as for his use. It was objected by defts Counsel on the authority of the case of Patterson vs. Gandasequi 15 East. 62 that as the principal in this Case was known, and the security ship was entered for the agent, the plf. had elected to have his recourse agt the latter & therefore had lost his recourse agt this principal— Decided that if this were a suit by B.C. agt the deft, the principle of that case might possibly apply, but that it was inapplicable to this case as there was no room for an election which could defeat the right of the plf. to resort to the principle for whom he was substantially the surety, tho nominally he was surety for the agent.

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The above are all the cases decided which will bear abridging, and even these are I fear so obscurely stated that you may find some difficulty in understanding them. I shall be impatient to hear from you and am very truly my dear Sir yr Affect. friend