It is about a week since I returned home, the session of the Phila. Court having been abridged by a severe rheumatic attack, which confined me to the house for many days prior to my departure. I have seldom, on any circuit, tried so few cases as on the last, and few of them were either new or difficult.  Such as are at all interesting, I will now proceed to state.

(1.) Lessee of West vs. Pine–This was a case which involved many new points, but most of them depended upon the peculiar phraseology of the stat. of limitations of N. Jersey. The only question of a general nature was, whether the plf. claiming title as devisee under the will of a person who decd seized of the land in dispute, was bound, in the first instance, to prove more than the possession of the devisor and the will.  Decided that he was not. The law presumes a fee simple interest in the devisor, and casts the possession on the devisee, unless this presumption is repelled by evidence on the other side.

(2.) Leverenge vs. Dayton—Assumpsit for so much mony paid by plf. for deft as his surety in a bond, under a Jugt & execution. The evidence to prove the payt was the following paper containing the docket entrees in a suit agt the deft and plf. as his surety duty certified by the clerk & Judg. of the court vizt U.S. vs. "Leverenge & Dayton. Now filed—on motion, Judgt for U.S. vs. Leverenge— ex. ca. sa. $1602 to which are added the interest & Costs in figures" "July 3d satisfaction acknowledged." The Court rejected the evidence, on the ground, that it¹ is not substantially a record of a Judgt for any thing, but merely minutes to enable a regular Judgt to be drawn up.

The plf. then offered a paper to the following effect "U.S. vs. Dayton and Leverenge in Dist. Court U.S. Ca. Sa." with an acknowledgment annexed signed by the marshal of that Court, that he had received of Levering, one of the said defts $1718 in full for debt interest & Costs in said suit. This was overruled by the Court, for want of the Judgt without which, the right of the marshal to recieve the mony did² not appear.

(3.) U.S. vs. Imbert. Ind. for manslaughter committed by one of the company of the ship A. on another of the company in the river Elba, the sd ship being the property of Citizen of the U.S. Decided that the prosecution can't be supported without proving the ship to have been the property of Citizens of the U.S. Whether the ship's register be the only legal evidence of such ownership, not decided, since there being no evidence of that fact, of any sort, the Jury were bound to acquit the prisoner.

(4.)³ action for violation of a patent for a new & useful improvent on a machine for making crackers. Deft gave in evidence a patent to J.S. for the same improvement, and offered to prove by J.S. that he was the first inventor. This witness was objected to, but admitted by the Court, as he had no interest in the event of this cause, altho he might be interested in the question, which affects his credit only.

2. To invalidate a patent upon the ground of prior use, the thing patented must appear to have been used prior to the alleged discovery; it is not sufficient to show that it had been in use prior to the application for the patent.

3. A person cannot have two valid coexisting patents for the same invention. But if his first patent be for the whole machine, of which he is shown not to have been the original inventor, he may afterwards obtain a valid patent for a part of that machine, being an improvent, of what he was the inventor, more particularly if, as in this case, he disclaims by his specification, all right to more parts of the original invention which are excluded from his second patent. Que. whether if the two patents be for the same invention, this disclaimer would not operate as a vacatur by way of estoppel? I incline to think it does, but I only stated in the point as a que.

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(5) Ex parte Craik.⁴ Rule upon the mayor, the examing & Committing magistrate, to show cause why he should not restore to the prisoner $1500 in notes of the bank of the U.S. admitted to be genuine, which were taken by that officer from the person of the prisoner on his examination under a change of forging the notes of that bank. for which offence a bill of indictment was found at the present Court. I could find no precedent for such a Case, but I did not hesitate to make the rule absolute, the notes having been taken by the mayor colore oficii, their being no charge agt the prisoner in relation to these notes, and his right of property in them being admitted. To deprive a prisoner in this way, of his means of employing counsel in his defence, and obtaining witnesses, would be to deprive him of privileges secured to him by the constitution, & it would be worse than a mockery to turn him over to his regular civil action. In this case, the prisoner had commenced an action agt the mayor, and I made his dismission of that suit a condition of making the rule absolute.

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(6) Astor vs. Girard. action for mony had and recd under the following circumstances. plea, the stat. of limitations. After it was ascertained that about 30.000 shares remained to be subscribed to the present bank of the U.S. to make up the 25 millions left for individual subscription, the plf. determined to subscribe for 1,000 shares which he communicated to the deft, who had made up his mind to take the whole 30,000 shares. But to avoid collusion, an agreement was entered into between them in august 1810 by which the deft bound himself to take the whole, and "that the plf. should participate with him in his subscription to the extent of 1000 shares, and stand in all respects in the same situation as he wd stand in case he were an actual subscriber." In consequence of this the plf. did not subscribe, but paid to the deft the specie and transferred to him on the 16 Sept. 1810 the 6 pr c. stock for the instalment on 1000 shares, the plf. having taken the whole 30,000 shares. On the 2d of October following, the quarter interest on the stock so transferred, which became payable the day before, was recieved by the deft and is the sum for which this suit is brought. The board of commissioners of the bank was organized the 4th of novr, and the next day, they resolved that the bank was intitled to all the interest on the stock constituting the 1st intalment which became due the 1st Octr, & that no transfer should be made on their books by any subscriber, till it was paid. On the 25th of novr that resolution was rescinded. on the 9th Novr the deft transferred the 1000 shares to the plf.— This suit was brought on the 29th novr 1822, and the question was, whether the plfs. cause of action for this interest accrued on the 2d Octr when it was recd by the defts or on the 25th Novr when the resolution of the 5th was rescinded by the bank, or on the 7th Jany 1817, when the board resolved to restore the interest which had been paid by the subscribers. If the 2d Octr, the action was barred by the stat.

Decided that it accrued on the 2d Octr, when, under the agreement that the plf. should participate with deft and stand in all respects &c. the equitable right of the plf. to receive the interest on his stock accrued, and what he would have recieved, had he been an actual subscriber, subject nevertheless to the undeniable right of the bank to devise such interest, if they chose to insist upon it.

(7) Goodwin vs. Lynn. Covenant upon an agreement made in June 1823, by which plf. covenanted to convey to deft a track of land on the 1st of april following, with 20 acres of it ploughed & sown in wheat, and to assign a certain lease, and also to deliver up possession, on which day, the deft covenanted to pay $2000 which is claimed in this action. plea non infregit. The declaration does not aver the ploughing and sowing of the land in wheat, or his readiness to assign the lease, but mostly that the plf. was on the land during the whole of the 1st april, with a deed of conveyance of the land, ready to be delivered, but that the deft did not come to receive it. No evidence of performance by plf. of his covenants was given except of his being on the land with a deed ready to be delivered, if the deft had come to receive it Charge. The covenant to pay the $2,000 was, on the order of time, & consequently, of construction, dependent on the covt to plough and seed, and the Covt to assign is concurrent. No proof having been given of performance of the first, or a readiness to perform the second, the plf. is not entitled to a verdict.

(8) Lessee of Rhode vs. Selin—This was a very complicated case, &, on account of the value of the property, was much contested. The following points were decided.

First, the exemplification of a deed of partition, recorded upon proof of its execution by all the parties to it but one, was offered in evidence & objected to for that cause and because the certificate of the recording officer states it to be "a true copy of the record & original deed, so far as it is legible." The Court allowed it to be read, the objections, if well founded, going to the effect of the deed & not to its admissability.

Second—It is no objection to the admission in evidence of the exemplification of a recorded deed, that the Justice who took the acknowledgement does not describe himself in the certificate to be the officer designated by the statute as authorised to take it. If he so describes himself, this is from a facie evidence to authorise the recording of it; but if he fail to do so, the omission may be supplied by other legal evidence that he was a person authorised to take the acknowledgment.

Third. An attorney may be compelled to testify agt his client as to facts which come to his knowledge otherwise than by the commication of his client. If he has in his possession a paper which his client might on notice be required to produce, he may be served with a notice at the bar to produce it, so as to let in secondary proof of its contents on his refusal to produce it. The papers in this case was delivered to the witness by his client.

Fourth. The party who requires the production of a paper at the trial, upon notice must prove it, unless the person producing it is a party to it, or claims an interest under it; otherwise, he cant give it in evidence.

Fifth. If the deft in ejectment claim title under a deed from an administrator who had sold the land to him under an order of the orphans Court, which sale was afterwards confirmed by a decree of that court, upon the report of the administrator, the plf. may give evidence that the decrees of that court were obtained by fraud and collusion, or that the sale was fraudulently made, & so avoid the title set up under the decrees & conveyance.

Sixth. Where a Judicial district is divided into two, (as was Pennsylva) by act of Congress, the causes remaining on the docket of the Court, which are not removed by the act to the new district, are, as to all their incidents, to be treated as if the act had not passed— this is an Execution may issue on a Judt rendered in them to the marshal of the new district, and be there levied. A deposition taken in them will be considered de bene esse, tho taken in the new district, and beyond 100 miles from the place of trial.

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(9) U.S. vs. Moses—Ind. for forging the notes of the bank of the U.S. The following points were resolved viz

First, that the officer or person upon whose information the warrant issued for the apprehension of the prisoner, is not bound to disclose the name of the person from whom he recd his information of the offence, public policy forbidding it, and that fact being immaterial to the prisoners defence 1 stark. evid. 106 2 do. 400. But the witness (being the apprehending officer) must answer the question "whether the person at whose house the prisoner was apprehended, (and where the scene of forgery was transacting at the time of the apprehension) had stated to the officer, that, at that time, if he would call in, he would have the prisoner there,"? for this may be important to the defence, for the purpose of Accounting for his presence there at the time, & the consequent inference that he was innocently entrapped there by the person at whose house, he was found.

Second—The declarations of the prisoner of his innocence, made at the time of his detection & apprehension, may be given in evidence to repel any presumption of guilt which might be inferred from his Silence.

Third—comparison of hands not evidence in criminal cases. It is so in civil cases as corroborative evidence by the common law of Pennsylvania 10 S. & R. 110.

Fourth. A question to a witness which the law forbids him to answer, (as if he asked the contents of a record) the court will not permit to be ask<ed.> But if it merely trench upon a priviledge of the witness. (as if it is calculated to make him accuse himself of a crime) the question may be asked but the court will not enforce an answer but will, apprize the witness of his privilege. A witness is not bound to answer a question which may disgrace or criminate him 1 Stark. Evid 137 to 145. 3 Stark. 4th part 1742 n<illegible>

Fifth. Evidence of the prisoners declartion at or about the time of his going to the house where he was apprehended, that he was going to collect a debt due to him by the owner of the house; may be given in evidence. 1 Stark. 46.7.<illegible>

sixth. To authorize a conviction, the Jury should be satisfied that the forged notes bear such a resemblance to the genuine, as might decieve a person of ordinary caution.

I have not room to say more than that the demijohn of wine was certainly put on board at Alexa.— Be so good as to have the demijohn examined <to> discover if there be any defect in it. The wine which I now intend to send you, shall for greater safety, be put into bottles & sealed.

My health is now better than it was last winter. I hope to hear soon from you, and that you are enjoying the same blessing in the fullest perfection, & that a kind Providence may preserve you during a long and prosperous life, for the good of our Country & the happiness of your family and numerous freinds, is the earnest prayer of my dear Story. your faithful friend & affect. servt