Altho I have been at home upwards of six weeks, yet this is the first day when it has been in my power to write to you. My whole time, when it was not engaged by company, has been devoted to a chancery suit in which I am, involved as Executor of Genl W., the entire management of which devolves necessarily upon me.

I held a shorter Session then usual th<is> last Spring in Phila., occasioned by the absence of one of the Counsel who was concerned in all the important, untried causes. Some decisions however of an interesting nature were given, which I will now proceed to report as concisely as I can.

1. Den e.d. The State of N. Jersey, & e.d. J. Gale vs. Babcock. This is the Cause which brings into controversy the title of the U.S. to the island in the Delaware called the Pea patch, on which much money has been expended in erecting fortifications. The Cause was removed into the C.C. from the Supreme Court of the State of N.J. under the 12th S. of the Judiciary act of 1789. Upon a motion to remand it, it was decided that, as to the State of N.J. the C.C. had not Jurisdiction of the Cause, the same not being given by any act of Congress, and that the cause therefore, so far as the State was concerned could not be removed into this Court. Another reason was that the right of removal under the above Section was confined to actions "by a Citizen of the State in which the Suit is brought" which a State cannot without an absurdity be said to be. That the Court could not split the Cause by retaining it as to Gale & remanding it as to the State, the above Sect. applying plainly to the whole cause— The Consequence was that the cause ought to be remanded. That a plff might in many, if not in all cases, commit a fraud upon the Jurisd. of the C.C. by introducing a Count in the name of a person not embraced by the 12th S. was admitted; but this inconvenience could be remedied only by Congress.

2. The Postmaster general vs. Ustick &c. Action on a post office bond, against the Sureties of the post master. Amongst many other pleas, there was one, which avered that the post master did not render his accounts, & pay over to the Post master general, the balance due by him at the end of every 3 months following the date of the bond, but wholly neglected to do the same, nor did the P.M.G. within 6 months after the end of every 3 months, cause Suit to be commenced agt him & the Sureties for the balances so due, nor did he give notice of such defaults to the defts, but fraudulently, unlawfully, & negligently, neglected to cause such suits to be brought & notice given— The plea also averred that the P.M. was, for many years after he had rendered himself liable to a suit, able to pay all that was due from him, but was insolvent when this suit was brought. To this plea, the plff demurred generally. I avoided giving an opinion on the general question; but decided that the plf. having admitted by his demurrer that the omissions charged in the plea were fraudulently committed, he could not recover. I confess that upon the general question of mere neglect, I feel great difficulty.

3d Mayer admtr. of Bonner vs. Foulkrod admtr. of Foulkrod—Bill in equity brought by the administrator of the assignee of a pecuniary legacy, agt the admtr. of the Executor of the Testator under whose will the title of the assignor to the legacy was devised. The plf., as well as his intestate, were Citizens of Maryland; and the deft a Citizen of the State where the suit was brought— The bill did not state that the legatee, (the assignor of the legacy) was a Citizen of another State, and might have sued in this Court. The deft demurred to the bill, and insisted 1st that this Court ha<d> not Jurisd. under the 11th S. of the Judiciary law, unless it appeared that the assignor could have sued in this Court. 2dy That this Court could afford full adequate & complete remedy for recovery of a legacy on its law Side, both upon general principles, and in virtue of a law of this State authorising such an action, & therefore has not Jurisdiction on its equity side. The 1st objection was overruled upon the authority of Chappedelane vs. Dechenaux & Sere vs. Pitot reported by Mr Wheaton. 2d. It was decided that an action will not lie, in a Court of law,¹ for a legacy, upon general principles, unless in Cases where the executor, in consideration of assets, assumes to pay it. But even were it otherwise, still it would not oust the Jurisd. of equity, the remedy there being more complete than any which a Court of law could afford see Coup. 284 Atkins vs. Hill²—Ib. 289 Hawkes vs. Sanders³—2 Mad. Ch. 2. 2 Fort. 321, 7 Cra. 370‑376 5 T. rep. 690 Deeks vs. Strutt. 5 Vez. 516 Blount vs. Bestand.⁴  

2. That tho the law of this State authorises an action at law, still it cant affect the equity Jurisd. of this Court, because by the act of Cong. of the 8th March 1792, C. 137 it is provided that "in Suits in equity the forms & modes of proceeding shall be according to the principles &c. which belong to Courts of Equity, as distinguished from Courts of Common law," thereby marking the line of partition between the two Jurisdictions, which no state law, prior or subsequent to the year [17]92, could alter or affect. But I could not admit that the Com. law & Equity Jurisd. of the U.S. Courts could be affected by State Laws which provide remedies for State Courts, or which prescribe their practice. The 34 S. of the Judiciary Act applies only to rights—not to remedies unless adopted by the U.S. Courts see 1 Gall. 18 also Robinson vs. Campbell 3 Wheat. & U.S. vs. Howland 4 Wheat.

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4th. Lessee of Holtzapple vs. Phillibaum. This Case involved a number of important questions in relation to the land law of Pennsylva. The only question of a general nature was, what constitutes an entry to avoid a right acquired by length of possession under the Stat. of la. which is similar to the act of assembly of that State. The only witness to prove an entry stated "that the party attended every year on the land, prosecuting and claiming his title to the land; that he was with him every year on the land, but could not remember what he said when he was there."—Decided, that this evidence was not sufficient to prove a legal entry to avoid the right gained by possession. That the person entering must not only do it with intent to claim the possession, but he must do some act to prove that such was his intention as by cutting a tree, digging the Soil, or some other act amounting to a trespass on the land; or he must declare in substance that he enters for the purpose of claiming or taking possession. This is a very different thing from prosecuting & claiming his title to the land, which he might do in a variety of ways without even intending to claim the immediate possession. See Ld Cooks Comment on Litt. Sect. 401 3 Blac. Com. 175. 7 East 311. 4 Johns. 402. Runn. 202. 1 Sand. 319.

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5. Eckert vs. Bauert— The Court laid it down as the practice in Equity suits not to make an order that service of the Subpena on the defendants attorney at law should be considered as good Service, except in injunction bills to stay proceedings on a Judgment at law, & in Cross suits, Where the plf. at law in the first, and the plff in equity in the second Case, resides without the Jurisd. of the Court.

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6th Corfield vs. Coryell‑ This case was argued, & taken under advisement, involving more Constitutional questions than I have even met with in any one Cause— Those arising out of the steam boat Cause are to be met with in this, and many others— With these, therefore, I will not trouble you at this time. But a question upon evidence was decided which may be mentioned. The plf. offered in evidence the record of a Sentence of condemnation in a N. Jersey Court passed in Conformity with an Act of Assembly of that State, attested by the Clerk of the Court, under its Seal, but not authenticated by the Presiding Judge in the manner pointed out by the act of Congress. It was offered, not as conclusive, but merely as prima facie evidence, upon the authority of a decision of Judge Yeates of the Supreme Court of Pennsyl. The court said that they knew no such distinction as conclusive & prima facie record evidence, the one, under the act of Congress, and the other at common law. That unless the record be authenticated as the act requires, it is not evidence for any purpose.

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7th Bosbyshell vs. Oppenheimer et al. Debt upon a bail bond, by the assignee; plea, comperuit ad diem. Replica. nul tiel record. It was objected by the deft that the cause was not at issue, there being no rejoinder. Decided that no rejoinder was necessary there being a complete affirmation & negation. It was then objected that the replication is faulty in not giving the deft a day to bring in the record. The Court decided that even if this were so, still the Cause would be at issue. But the replication is not faulty for the alleged reason, the rule being that where the deft pleads a record of the same Court (as this was) the replication, nul tiel record, concludes with a verification, and a day is assigned to the parties to hear Judgment. alter where it is a record of another Court. 1 Chitty Plead. 572. Barns Notes 164.

Upon inspecting the record, the Court decided in favor of the replication, in as much as it appeared by the record, that the deft in the original Suit, on an exception taken to the special bail put in, required to Justify, & consequently that he had not legally appeared. The Court ordered Judgment to be entered for the penalty of the bond, and at a subsequent day, directed, that a writ of enquiry should be awarded in the original action to ascertain how much was due to the plf., for which sum the execution should issue in this Case. But before this latter direction was given, the plf. took out an execution and got it levied for the sum he claimed to be due— The deft then obtained a rule to show cause why the execution should not be set aside as having issued prematurely. The Court set it aside upon the 23d S. of the Judiciary law which forbids an execution to issue until the expiration of 10 days from the Judgt entered. This, by the bye, is an extraordinary provision, & may often be very inconvenient to the plff.

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8th. U.S. Bank vs. Jones.⁵ The question was whether the protest of a notary publick of a note given to the bank could be given in Evidence to prove a demand on the maker of the note, and notice to the endorser? By an act of Assembly of Pennsylv. passed in 1815 the official acts of notarys publick are made good evidence & on this act the Supreme Court of the State has admitted the protest in evidence for the purposes abovementioned. I decided that upon the law merchant, notes of hand are not protestable, & therefore not official acts, & consequently not evidence of a demand or notice — That the Act of assembly is not binding on this Court, since the rules of evidence to be observed by the federal Courts, as well as their practice, & modes of proceeding, cannot be changed or affected by State laws.

I shall be anxious, My dear Sir, to know your sentiments respecting the above Cases, and to receive a report of your decisions from which I always derive both pleasure & profit— Believe me to be truly yr friend & affect. Servt