Yesterday was the first day that I was at liberty to read your letter of the 19th July with the attention it deserved, and to look into a few Cases. I regret that is not in my power to devote more time¹ in examining the authorities before returning you an answer; but this is prevented by the necessity I am under of leaving home in a day or two for the Springs, whence I shall proceed on my circuit.

After the best consideration which I have been able to give to the cases decided by you on your Spring Circuit, I very truly assure you that I do not differ from you in any one of them. Some of them are new and I shall beg the favor of you to furnish me with a list of any Cases which you may have a note of upon which you probably proceeded—this for my future ease, in case such points should come before me.

In the Suffolk Bank vs. Lincoln Bank, the principles of your decision are, I believe, well founded in law, & the grounds, if it be new, as it probably is in one or two of the points, is so rational &, as you observe, wholesome, that I shall occupy it should such a case occur in my Circuit. I am clearly of opinion that an actual demand of payment of a bank, or other note payable on demand, is not necessary. Wallis vs. Scott. Stra. 88 Cro. El. 548 & many others to the same effect.

Haven vs. Holland— I accord de tout mon coeur.

In the Indictment Case for perjury, the variance was substantial & fatal.

Conyers vs. Lambard— The rice was sent to R. as the vendee, and not as the factor of the plff factors, and the right of property was consummated by its coming to the possession of R.'s admtr. It could only have been prevented by a Stoppage in transitu, which not having been done, the vendor could not follow the goods into the hands of the admtr.

Bean vs. Smith. The points decided in this case are highly interesting, insomuch, that they will engage my attention the first leisure day I have in Phila. where I can have access to John. C. Cases & the english cases— Chancellor Kent goes (as well as I recollect) on the ground that by vertue of the 13th St. the voluntary Conveyance was utterly void, so that the grantee under it had nothing to convey. I wish to examine the Cases he cites. (Bring your opinion in this case to Washington).

In Hunt vs. Rousmanier's admt. one of the points decided is that a power of atty given as a Collateral Security for a debt, is irrevocable by the grantor, but it dies with him— it is not a power coupled with an interest.

This I think is reasonable; but I cannot understand Willes 103-4 to which you refer as in point, as supporting it, & presume that through mistake, you have given me the wrong authority. The point decided in Willes, is, that an attorney recieving mony after the death of the person who gave it, recieves it, not for the testator, but under an implied power from the Executor, and therefore the Executor may sue the attorney without naming himself Exectr— I presume that the Court went on the ground of an implied power, because the Court say that the tenants were discharged, which they could not be if the power died with the giver of it, & the attorney had not some other power to recieve the mony. But this was the case of a naked authority. I think your decision right, but will thank you for the authorities. I agree with you on all the other points in that case.

Having occasion to write to the Chief Justice soon after I returned from Phila., I asked his opinion upon the question of the bill of Exchange. He thinks it is an inland bill; but I know he did not examine the question or give it much consideration. I have gone as thoroughly into it as my talents and books would enable me, and am now thoroughly satisfied with the opinion I at first entertained, (and which I am greatly consoled by finding accords with yours) that it is a foreign bill— my opinion on the point is completed, & after it is delivered, I will give you the substance of it.

As to the question of Costs, you will recollect that I avoided giving an opinion upon the point² whether the plf. could have recovered Costs if he had obtained damages to the amt of $500, because I thought it possible that they might be given by some act of Congress in all cases, or that it might have received the sanction of an inveterate practice, the extent of which I was not then aware of. I nevertheless am not satisfied, my dear friend, with your construction of the Stat. of Gloucester, which I take for granted is adopted in Pennsylv. since the Counsel on both Sides argued upon it and gave no intimation that it was not the law of that state.

Your opinion seems to be fully supported by Gwillim, but not so, I think by the authorities he quotes.

 2. Inst. 289 fully recognizes Pilfords³ case, and unless where he afterwards says "this clause extends to give Costs where dam. are given in any action by any Stat. made after the Stat. of Glouc." he means cases where damages were also recoverable at Com. law, he expressly contradicts what he had as expressly declared before.

Wiltham vs. Hill 2 Wils. 91 proceeds on the ground that damages were recoverable at Com. law, and that the Stat. only changed the object.

But in pat. cases, dam. were not recoverable at all at Com. law agt any one, & the act of Congress not only gives damages, but prescribes the form of action.

In the above case, Pilford's case is fully recognized, tho Willes calls it a strange one. It is also recognized in Wilkinson vs Alliot Cowp. 366.

The Case from 1 T. rep. 71 is the strongest cited—but no cases are Cited by the Court, and no reasons assigned. Willes merely says, somewhat Dogmatically, that it has been the constant usage to give Costs in actions in the Stat. of hue & Cry.

Ward vs. Snell 1 St. B. 10 proceeds on the ground that the penalty, as soon as the offense was committed became a debt due to the party grieved before action brought, & having recovered that debt, Costs follow of Course. But the Stat. of Glouc. refers to damages & so does the rule in Pilfords Case.

I admit after all that the Judges have appeared to desire to shake off the authority of Pilfords case; but I do not think they have been bold enough to go that length. I mean however to examine into this point with more labor hereafter.

As to the point decided in Kneass' case, I feel more confident— It is possible that Cong. may have intended to confine the 20th Sect. of the J. A. to cases arising at Com. law, & not to those under the Constitu. or laws of the U.S. (as to which I expressed some doubt in my opinion) but yet, as the words of the Sect. are as broad as they could be, I did not feel myself at liberty to restrain them. I am still of that opinion.

And now my dear Sir let me conclude this long and hurried letter with my thanks for the pleasure & instruction which I have recieved from yours— I always carry your letters with me on my Circt to refer to until a vol. of your decisions comes out.

I had the pleasure of a visit from your brother lately who did me the favor to dine with me—⁴ He is much like you. I hope you have recd the hams & in good order.

Health & a long life to you for your Country's sake—for that of your family & friends, & of the Court of which you are so distinguished a member—Believe me truly yr afft. & faithful friend