“The present is a joint indictment against the prisoners for murder [onboard the schooner Fairy out of Boston]. They have severally pleaded not guilty. And a motion has now been made in writing, in behalf of one John D. White, otherwise called Charles Marchant, that he may be tried separately; and this he claims, as a matter of right. The motion is resisted on the part of the District Attorney for the United States, who utterly denies, that there exists any such right in law; and the parties are now before us upon the mere matter of right.

“Indictments for the murder of Edward Selfridge, on the high seas, on the 28th of August, 1826. Plea, not guilty. After a verdict of guilty, Jarvis and Dunlap, counsel for the prisoner, moved in arrest of judgment, and also for a new trial, because no copy of the indictment was furnished two days before the prisoner’s arraignment and pleading, according to the statutes of 1790, eft. 9, § 29. The motions were argued at length by them, and replied to by Blake, District Attorney, for the United States.”

“The plaintiff is an inhabitant of Batavia in the island of Java, and the bill is brought to recover against the executors of Clarke the amount of a bill of exchange drawn in behalf of the owners of the ship Patterson, by Benjamin Monroe, their agent at Batavia, on a mercantile house in Amsterdam for 21,438 guilders. The bill of exchange was dated 3 Nov. 1806, payable at nine months sight, was presented and protested for non-acceptance, 30 December, 1807, and was presented and protested for non-payment, 4 Oct. 1808.”

“This was a bill inequity, the object of which was, to obtain satisfaction out of the separate estate of John Innes Clarke, Esq. deceased, of a debt alleged to be due from said Clarke, and Messrs. James Monroe, Samuel Snow, and Benjamin Monroe, who survived the said Clarke, but had become insolvents under the Rhode-Island act.”

“This action was brought to recover the contents of a promissory note, dated at Providence, &c. given by the defendant to the plaintiff, payable at a certain time, which had elapsed before the suit was brought. The defendant pleaded a discharge under the insolvent act of Rhode-Island, after the note was given and before it became due. To this plea there was a general demurrer and joinder. The cause was shortly argued by Tristram Burgess for the plaintiff, and Robbins for the defendant.”

“Indictment on the second and third sections of the Act of 20th of April, 1818, ch. 86, against the slave trade. There were various counts in the indictment, but that which was principally relied on, was for causing a certain vessel, called the Science, to sail from the port of New York, for the purpose of procuring negroes, &c. from Africa, to be transported and held, sold and disposed of as slaves. At the trial the cause turned principally on questions of fact.”

“Debt for the penalty of 500 dollars against the defendant, master of a coasting vessel, for suffering the locks and fastenings, put on the hatches of the vessel, by an inspector of the customs, to be broken, contrary to the 54th section of the Revenue Collection Act of 2d of March, 1799, ch. 128. The defendant pleaded nil debet, on which issue was joined.

“Assumpsit with the common money counts. The defendant pleaded in bar of the action the statute of limitations of the State of New-York, where the contract was made, to which the plaintiffs demurred. The question raised in the present case, is whether the limitation act of the state, where a contract is made, shall govern the decision of this court, sitting in another state, in which judicial proceedings are instituted for the purpose of enforcing the contract.”

“Ejectment for land. The cause turned altogether upon the consideration of a clause in the will of Thomas Arnold, and was argued on the following statement of facts, agreed upon by the parties. ‘At the time of the making of Thomas Arnold's will, and also at the time of the testator’s death, Peleg Arnold was under the age of twenty-one years, being the testator’s youngest son. John Arnold was the second son of the testator, and was then over twenty-one years of age; and Thomas Arnold was the testator’s eldest son. These three sons were by different wives.

“Case for an infringement of certain patent rights, granted to the plaintiff. There were two counts on two distinct patents in the declaration, but the first was the only one relied on at the trial, being on a patent for ‘an improvement on the double speeder for roping cotton,’ &c. The cause was tried on the general issue. The patent was dated the 3d of April, 1819, and the specification annexed to it, contained a very minute description of the double speeder as improved by the plaintiff, under distinct articles.