“This cause comes before the court upon an agreement of counsel that judgment should be entered for the plaintiffs for $2981 23 cents, subject to the opinion of the court on the question, ‘whether the plaintiffs, being a corporation established by congress, within the city of Philadelphia, can maintain a suit in this court against the defendants, being a corporation established by an act of the legislature of this state, within the jurisdiction of the same, and transacting business therein.’ By the second section of the third article of the constitution of the United States, it is declared,

“The plaintiff obtained a rule upon the defendants to show cause why the costs in this suit should not be trebled. This was retorted by a rule obtained by the defendants, to show cause why the judgment should not be entered, without costs. C. J. Ingersoll and Phillips, for the plaintiff, cited the following cases in support of their own rule, and in opposition to the defendants. 1 Leon. 282. 2 Inst. 289. Carth. 294, 321. 1 L. Ray. 19. Cro. Eliz. 582. Pilford’s case, 10 Rep. 116. Sayer on Costs, 1—8, 195.

“The special verdict stated, that in the lifetime of Abner Mitchel, the intestate, the plaintiffs sent to him, for sale, two bills of exchange on France, with instructions to remit them the proceeds. The intestate sold the bills, and remitted to the plaintiffs the proceeds of one of them, except $60, which he had in bank notes of the South Carolina banks. For the other bill he took the check of the purchaser, payable some days after the sale.

“This case, although it comes before the court in the form of a rule to show cause why the action should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, is connected with that question by an agreement of the counsel, that the finding of the jury, subject to the opinion of the court upon the question of jurisdiction, should be put into the form of a special verdict, and judgment to be entered thereon, as may be decided on this rule, so as to enable either party to sue out a writ of error to the Supreme Court.

“Action of assumpsit to recover from the defendant $2091, the balance of an account due from the former co-partnership of Lindsay and Tomlinson. The facts of the case, as opened and proved by the defendant’s counsel, were as follow. Lindsay and Tomlinson entered into partnership some time in October 1815, under the firm of Lindsay and Tomlinson, and after contracting with the plaintiffs the debt in question, they dissolved their connection, some time in January 1816, upon the terms that Tomlinson should retain the partnership funds, and pay all the debts due from the concerns. Immediately.

“Indictment for serving on board a vessel employed in transporting a slave from the island of St Thomas, to the island of Cuba; contrary to the act of the 10th of May 1800., See Vol. III. of the Acts of Congress, page 382, section 2.

“This case came before the court upon, a rule to show cause, why the judgment against Sullivan should not be set side. The facts of the case are the following: In the year 1800, an amicable action of account render, was entered in this court by the plaintiff, against the defendants. The agreement on the part of the defendants was signed by Strawbridge, and a judgment quod computent was entered on the 21st of October, in the same year. The declaration states the plaintiff to be a citizen of Georgia, Strawbridge a citizen of Pennsylvania, and Sullivan a citizen of Massachusetts.

“Action for a malicious prosecution. The plaintiff produced the record, of the indictment in the mayor’s court of this city for larceny, which the grand jury returned ignoramus. The plaintiff proved that the defendant, Mountford, put into the hands of a constable of the city a warrant to arrest the plaintiff on a charge of larceny, issued by Mr Badger, one of the aldermen. A search warrant for the goods supposed to have been stolen had previously been delivered to him, which proved ineffectual in the search.

“This was a suit on the equity side of the court.

“The bill states that the female plaintiff is the daughter of Daniel P. Knight, formerly of Philadelphia, county, who, on the 22d of April 1808, conveyed to James Darrach, Thomas Bioren, and John Bioren, a certain real estate in trust for himself for life, and after his death, to the use of his said daughter in fee tail; and in default of issue, to the use of the children of Michael Knight, and his sister Elizabeth, as tenants in common in tail; and in default of such issue, then to the use of said Daniel P. Knight and his heirs. That the said Daniel P.