I am grieved to learn by your late letter of your continued indisposition— I heard in the autumn quite by accident of your sickness at Philadelphia; but I presumed it was temporary. I most earnestly hope & pray that a good Providence will restore you to health & enable you to attend at the February Term. I shall feel quite lost <illegible> without you; & must say in all sincerity & frankness that I know not in whose judgment I have implicit a reliance, as in yours.

I did not owing to sickness—sudden & severe—go my Autumnal Circuit in the new state of Maine— In New Hampshire there was nothing to do to— In Boston I passed considerable time, but there were few causes of great interest except some cases under the Slave Trade Act of 1818. They turned principally on questions of fact & the evidence was very strong & they were convicted— The few law points arising I have noted for your information— The convention to amend the Constitution of Massachusetts having met soon afterwards I did not go to the Rhode Island. The Bar there having agreed to excuse my attendance on account of my military engagements as a member of the Convention— with the exception of a fortnight during which I was sick myself & one of my children was dangerously sick but is—thanks to a gracious providence—recovered, I have been entirely devoted for two months to the business of the convention— We have great debate, & violent struggles & have had to stem a host of prejudices & passions & popular appeals; but I trust we have saved the sound parts of the Constitution & have prevented some mischiefs, & made some improvements— I had put one part to act, to endeavour with all my might to support good principles of government & to fence in our old Institutions— religious, civil & <illegible> reformers of all sorts. I suspect my old political friends thought me somewhat a heretic. But if I may so say in the language of St Paul after the way which they call heresy, so worship I the God of my fathers & so do I reverence the due decisions of government against the popular speculations & reforms so fashionable in our day.

From these engagements I have but just been released. The convention rose only three or four days since. Of course I have little of Law decisions to give you.

U.S. v. La Coste. Indictd on the Slave Trade Act of 1818 ch. 86 S.2. & S.3. for causing a vessel to sail from the port of New York for the purpose of procuring Slaves. The vessel was captured on the Coast of Africa & the Dft was master & was first brought into Boston for trial. It was proved at the trial that the port of New York was contingent to the high sea, & the exterior limit of the port in the high seas. It was contended that the offence was committed within the District of New York & the crime was alone trial <illegible> there. That the words of the Statute “cause to sail from any port” included the port itself. The Court overruled the objection & held that the offence could not be committed by subject within the port. That from the port was exclusive of the port, & that the crime commenced only by a departure over the exterior limit of the port which was on the Sea & consequently was triable in the Cirt Ct of Massa.

U.S. v. Mantor— Error from the District Court in an action of Debt for the penalty of 500 dollars for breaking locks & fastening put on a vessel by an Inspector agt the 54th section of the Collection Act of 1799 ch. 128. The vessel was a coasting vessel; & the only question was whether that Section applied to vessels in the coasting trade, or only to vessels engaged in foreign trade— After a good deal of hesitation & reflection I held that as the language was general in this Section & the mischief was the same, coasting vessels were within the section & reversed the decision of the District Judge.

Leroy v. Crowninshield— Assumpsit on a note— Plea. Statute of Limitations of New York, where the note was made. Demurrer & joinder— The Ct held upon certainty that the plea was bad— I delivered a very elaborate opinion reviewing all the Doctrine on this subject & delivering that if the question were new I should have held the plea good; as well as a plea of the Statute of Limitations of the State, where the suit was brought. I have not time to give you my views; but I will take the opinion with me to Washington.

Arnold v. Buffum. A devise to the Testators wife until his son P. should attain 21 and after P. should attain 21. That he should enter into possession, to him & his heirs & assigns forever. But if P. should die before he attained 21. or without lawful issue then the premises to descend to the Testators heir male in fee simple P. attained 21 & died without issue— The Court held that <mutilated> fee simple pay the devise originally defensible but <mutilated> Events absolute, & it descended to his own heirs in the <mutilated>nal line. The opinion was exceedingly elaborate & examined & compound all the leading authorities.

There were two other very important decisions. One was a patent case¹— the other a bill in equity.² Both of them were so complicated that I despair of giving you any clear view of them except by bringing the opinions with me & explaining them verbally.

I had almost forgotten to state to you that about three months since I sent you, via Baltimore, to the care of Mess. Robert & J. Osgood merchants there, a quintal of fish. It was excellent when I sent it & if it arrives in good order, you will agree with me in opinion.

The case referred to by Mr Harper has no bearing on the point on which the Ct. decide the Isabella. As to some other points it might have a bearing if there had been any reasoned opinion in Bro. Parly cases. But after the argt it is simply said the judgment was reversed—without any statement of reasons— On the points to which I allude I think it makes more agt than for him. With continued wishes for your health & happiness. I am most affectionately your friend