I returned from my Circuit yesterday after an absence of 3 months wanting as many days. I was ten weeks in Court without intermission, and have upon no former occasion had so many important cases to decide. Notwithstanding the length & severity of this tour of duty, my health, thank God, has continued to improve, and I now feel as well as I have been for some years past. my first employment in my study, is to make to you, my friend, the semiannual report of the cases decided, many of which you will find to be new & interesting.

Wilmarth vs. Mounford—Act. for a malicious prosecution. The deft, being a creditor of R. who became insolvent and made an Asst of his effects to deft, for the benefit of his Creditors, contrived a fraud by which to get into his possession as much of the effects of R. as would pay his debt in full. In execution of the plan he procured one S. to call on the deft & to buy a parcel of those effects¹ as for himself & to have them sent to the house where the plf & S. lodged— This was done, S. promising to pay for the goods when they should be delivered. They were accordingly sent by a clerk of deft, who laid them down whilst S. affected to be looking in his pocket book for bank notes to pay the bill. He stopt however his search, & referred the clerk to the plf., in the next room, who would pay him— The plf. offered in payt the note of R., which was refused, the goods belonging not to R. but to his assignee. During this conversation, the goods were removed— S. disappeared, & the plf. got the goods which he refused to return­— a warr[an]t was then obtained by deft, under which the plf. was arrested & indicted for Larceny, but the Bill was not found— charge—That there was probable cause, if not more, for the prosecution. That the transaction fixed S. with a charge of Larceny, & if the Jury were satisfied that the plf. was associated with him in the plot, he was equally guilty of that offence. verd. for deft.

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Kitchen vs. Sullivan & Strawbridge. declara. in account render by K. of Georgia, agt Sullivan of Massachussetts, & Strawbridge of Pennsyla.— general appearance entered by Straw. for both defts—Judgt quod computent. Rule by Sull. or plf. to show cause, why the Jugt should not be set aside, & the suit dismissed as to him. opinion— The Court had not Jurisd. of the Case as to this deft, as neither he nor the plf., was a Citizen of the State where the suit was brought— Jurisd. could not be given, even if this deft had voluntarily entered an appearance, which was not the case. Harrison vs. Rowan & Peters refs.—2d the Judgt quod computet is interlocutary only, and consequently the cause is yet depending, and within the power of the Court. Rule made absolute.

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Lonsdale vs. Brown—1st Count on a bill of exchange—2d on a new promise made 2 years after the bill was protested, by the deft, to pay the bill, if he the plf. would indulge the deft with time, & he should ever be able to pay it, with an averment that the plf. did indulge him for 5 years, & that deft was able. pleas non assumpsit. The proof was that the promise was made personally to the plf., but the witness in his deposition did not state whether plf. made any, or what answer. But that he did in fact wait for more than 5 years, & that deft was able, were fully proved. In answer to the 1st Count, deft offered to give in evidence the record of a verd. & Judgt in his favor on the same bill. The Court decided that in actions of assumpsit, & on the case, deft may give in evid. a former Judgment for the same cause of action, & is not driven to this plea in bar. 3 Burr. 1353 & many other Cases.

The plf. offered on the 1st Count, to prove presentation of the Bill, & refusal to accept, the protest. objected, that, as the bill was drawn in N. orleans, on Pennsylva. it was an inland bill, & the protest was not Evid[ence]. The Court admitted the protest, reserving the point, and this I now have under advisement, & wish your opinion. The only case I can meet with is Miller vs. Hackley 5 Johns. rep. with which I am not satisfied. on the 2d Count, it was stated to the Jury that the silence of the plf., and the subsequent indulgence granted the deft, gave validity to the contract, sufficient for him to recover on, if the defts ability to pay was proved.

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U.S. vs. Kennedy. Ind. for serving on board a vessel employed in transportg a slave from one W. India island to another, contrary to the act of the 10th May 1800—3 vol. p. 382. S.2. Decided 1. that this act is to be construed to apply to a transportation of slaves from one foreign country to another, for the purpose of traffic. quere, if it should not be confined to the transportation from Africa, or elsewhere, from a state of freedom to one of bondage? but no opinion given. 2d that the 2d Seat embraces the Master, who may strictly be said to serve on board.

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Harris vs. Lindsay. Deft and one T. as partners in trade, became indebted to plf. on a balance of $1000 & then dissolved, T. agreeing to retain the funds, & pay the debts. T. & R. then formed a part[nershi]p, and dissolved, leaving also a balance of $500 due the plf. T. & W. formed a partp and also had dealings with plf., and dissolved, leaving a balance of $4500 due to the plf.: With full knowledge of the nature of the agreement between the deft & T. when they dissolved, the plf. entered into an arrangement with T., by which the above three balances were consolidated, and the plf. accepted from T. his 3 notes for $2000 each, payable at 60, 90 & 120 days, & gave his rect for the same to be passed to the Credit of T. when the same should be paid. T. becoming insolvent, the plf. brought this suit agt L. for the balance of acct due by L. & T.—charge—Altho a creditor is not bound by agreements made between partners, his debtors similar to that between the deft & T; still, if, with a full knowledge of such agreement, he enters into a totally new Contract with the paying partner, by which the whole nature of the partp debt is changed, & this without the consent of the retiring partner, such new Contract will amount to an acceptance by the Creditor of the paying partner as his debtor, & a discharge of the other. Such was this case— By consolidating the bal. due by L. & T. with balances due by other persons, the nature of the defts' responsibility was changed; for altho one or two of the notes taken in lieu of it should have been paid by T. even out of the funds of L. &. T. yet the deft could never plead payt to an action agt him; because he could never show that such payments were applicable to his balance, more than to the other two.

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Lessee of Butler vs. Farnsworth. The cause turned upon a question of Jurisd.— Butler removed with his family in 95, from S. Carolina, to Phila. where he purchased a house, & has ever since resided. He represented the State of S.C. in Congress till 1804— Till 1812, he was in the habit annually of visiting his estate in S.C. his family always continuing in Phila. — since 1812, he has never been to S. Carolina. The Court laid down the following principles—That Citizenship, in reference to federal Jurisdiction, means residence, animo manendi— The question of law arising upon the facts of each case—is, has the party, removing from one State to another, become incorporated into the new Society, so as to be a member of it as he was of the political family from which he emigrated? In other words, has he changed his domicile, & become a permanent resident of the State to which he has removed? There residence is prima facie evid. of such a change, which however may be repelled, by showing that it was for a temporary purpose only. If it were intended to be permanent, he is a Citizen of the State to which he removed, altho he may not have intended to throw off his character of Citizen of the other State, & may publickly so have expressed himself.

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Viel vs. Admtr. of Michel— plf. remitted to the intestate 2 bills of Exchange to sell— he sold both & remitted to plf. the proceeds of one, except $60 in S. Carolina bank notes— For the other bill, he took he check of the purchaser at so many days, before the expiration of which, M. died, & the check, together with the $60 in bank notes specifically came to the hands of the deft, who recieved the amount of the check & had not paid away the same, or the $60, when this suit was brought. Decided, that the plf. might follow these funds into the hands of the admtr., & was entitled to recover in this action. The Intestate died insolvent except as to the above funds.

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Kneass vs. Schuylkill Bank— Plf. having, in a patent cause, recoverd 3 Cents damages, obt[aine]d a rule on deft to show cause why the Costs should not be trebled. Cross rule by Deft on plf. to show cause why Judgt should not be entered without Costs. opinion. The 20th S. of the Judicial law applies as well to Cases arising under the Constitution & Laws of the U.S. as to actions at Com. law, & consequently under that Sect., the plf. is not entitled to Costs. Even if the verd. had given more than $500, it might be doubtful if the plf. would be entitled to Costs, as none were given at Common law, & the Stat. of Glouc. gives them only in cases where damages were recoverable at Com. law, & this is a Case which arises altogether under the Act of Cong. which does not give Costs. (What do you say as to this latter point?) First rule discharged & the 2d made absolute.

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Bank of the U.S. vs. the Bank of Northumberland. The latter was chartered by the Legislature of this state, is located, & carries on business in this state. Decided that this Court has Jurisd. of the Cause, the act incorporating the B. of the U.S. having given it a right to sue &c. in the C. Courts of the U.S.— The reasons of the opinion similar to those laid down in the Bank of the U.S. vs. Roberts in the C. Court of Kentucky.

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U.S. vs. Lancaster. It is astonishing that the facts of this cause were not understood by the Counsel on either side, or by you or myself, until after a, minute examination of them after the argument at the last Circuit, the Counsel on both sides arguing as if there had been a Judgement prior to the pardon, whereas the very case before the Court was that in which the validity of the pardon was in question. The Judgement was rendered on the embargo bond, whereas this suit was on the appeal bond. Whether the President can pardon away the Collectors interest even before Judgement was not decided; but if he can, his prerogative in that respect is greater than that of the King of England, who cannot in popular actions, pardon away the private interest after suit brought. There may however be a difference between those cases & this,2 where the suit is in the name of the U.S., and the D. Attorney is directed by the Prest to discontinue the action.

In this case however, I decided, that the pardon was so worded, as to pardon only the interest of the U.S. & did not effect that of the Collector.

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Randelollday vs. Darrieux— The only question was whether in an action against an innocent endorser of a bill of exchange, who paid full value for the Bill, notice to him of the dishonor of the bill, can be dispensed with, on the ground, that the drawer had no effects in the hands of the Drawee, nor any right to expect it would be paid? The Court decided that the endorser was entitled to notice.

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Lessee of Penns vs. Kline—rule by deft on the Marshal to return the Hab[ere] fac[ias] possess[ionem]. Decided, on the authority of the cases cited in Running. 434, that the deft, cant call on the Marshal to return the writ.

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Glassels admtrs. vs. Wilsons admtr.—Decided that to maintain an action in the C. Court of this state, by an admtr., who qualified in another State, where the intestate died, it is not necessary for him to obtain letters of administration in this State, the decisions of the Sup. Court of this State showing that they do not require it. The case in 1 Cra. 259 went upon the Law of Maryland.

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Dunham vs. Ryley—on the tract of a Cause, the deft cant nonsuit the plf. under the 15 S. of the Judicial act, for not producing papers which he had notice to produce, unless he had first obtained an order of the Court, upon a proper rule, to produce them. This order may be absolute, or nisi cause shown at the trial.

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Binns vs. Woodruff. Bill in Equity by plf., claiming the Copyright to the declaration of Independence (which you no doubt have seen) and praying an injunction to restrain deft from printing, publishing or selling a print of sd declaration of a plan exactly similar to, & copied from that of the plf.— It appeared by the bill answer & depositions that the plfs. engraving was designed & arranged by one Bridport—that the ornaments connecting the arms, the devices at the top of the print, & the representation of the characteristic productions of the U.S. were also designed by the same person. the portraits & arms of the different States & of the U.S. were taken by Sully from original paintings; & the fac Similies were copied by some other person from the original signatures. In short, that the plf. had no other merit than employing the artists & paying them. opinion— 5 The person intended as the proprietor of a Copy right by the act of Cong. is one, who shall not only invent and design, but who shall also engrave &c. the print; or who, from his own words & inventions, shall cause the print to be designed & engraved &c. In the first case, the inventer is identified with the engraver &c. or, in other words, the entire work is executed by the same person— in the latter, the invention is designed or embodied by the person in whom the Copy right is vested, & the form & completion of the work is executed by another; such person must not only invent, but he must design or delineate the subject in some visible form, tho he may not be able to give it its ultimate form by painting or engraving, but may employ an artist for that purpose— This distinction is illustrated by the 2 Cases of Blackwell vs. Harper 2 Atk. and Jeffries vs. Baldwin Amb. 164.

In this case, the plf. neither invented and designed, nor did he, from his own works and inventions, cause to be designed & engraved the print for which he claims a Copy right—Bill dismissed.

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Palmer & Co. vs. Arch. Gracie & Sons. The defts chartered the Ship America to one C. on a voyage from Phila. to Calcutta, with liberty to sell her Cargo or part of it at Madeira—there to take in other Cargo, & to dispose of the same at Calcutta—There to take in a C.—return Cargo for Phila.—$32000 to be paid at Phila. by the charterer— The charter party contains the usual stipulations, the owners, furnishing & paying the master & Crew and covenanting for their faithful performance of the various stipulations— part of the Cabin reserved for the master & officers, & of the hold for their adventures. In short, it resembles the cha[r]ter parties in the Cases of McIntyre vs. Bowne 1 John. rep. 239, and Hooe vs. Groverman 1 Cra.

The charterer being unable to load the Ship at Calcutta for her return voy., put her up as a general Ship, & got her half filled, at different rates of freight, as he could agree with the Shippers. Upon his application to the plf., a Mercht at Calcutta, he advanced him as much mony as purchased a full Load, the charterer & Master agreeing that the goods so purchased should come freight free, as upon no other terms would the Cargo, as the parties supposed, be sufficient to reimburse the plf. his advance— A bill of Lading was filled up, accordingly, and endorsed to plf., who forwarded it to their agents in Phila., with directions to take & sell that part of the Cargo to discharge the advance, in case the bills drawn by the charterer for the amount should not be accepted.

On the Ship's arrival at Phila., the bills were presented & protested, & the plfs. agents demanded that part of the cargo according to bill of Lading— This was refused by deft unless the freight was paid— The agents paid $10,000 in order to get the Cargo, under an understanding that this action shd be brought to recover it back, & thus to try the right of lien of the defts for freight on these goods.

 1. After a minute review of the following Cases, it was decided, that the owner of the Ship, in this Case, did not part with the possession of her, and was entitled to a lien for freight where it was due. we laid down the general rule, deducible from the Cases, to be, that, where the owner employs the master & Crew & pays them—retains the control and navigation of the vessel, by means of the Master, and is responsible for his conduct, & that of the Crew, a special ownership does not vest in the Charterer, altho the freigh[t] reserved is a gross sum, & notwithstanding the words let & hire, or other words of grant. Consequently, he has a lien for freight— Cases cited on both sides. 2 Stra. 1251—3 Esp. rep. 27—2 Camp. rep. 482. 15 East 547. 3 M. & S. 215. 5 Bos. & P. 185. Saville vs. Campion, Barn. & Ald. rep. Paul vs. Burch 2 Atk. Vallejo vs. Wheeler Cowp. Frazer vs. Marsh. 13 East. 4 M. & S. 288. Hutton vs. Brag 2 Marshals rep. 339.³ See Holt on Shipping a late work. 1 Cra. 236. 8 Cra. 49. 1 John. rep. 239 2 Galli. 61.

2d That the only ground on which freight can be demanded is Contract, express, or implied. If therefore, the charterer agree to take a Cargo, as was done in this case, upon such terms as he & the shippers could agree, the owner has a lien on the goods for such freight as was so agreed upon, & for no more. If the owner could exact more, the consequence wd be, that no person, wishing to load the Ship back on a freight⁴ less than what the charterer was to pay, would do so, & she must return empty to the injury both of the owner & charterer. Paul vs. Birch 2 Atk. Hyde vs. Wallis 2 Camp. 203.

3d. If the master acting fairly and with an honest view to the benefit of all concerned, & particularly with the consent of the charterer, & in virtue of his Contract with third persons, agrees to take on board a Cargo freight free, it is not liable to a lien of the owner for any freight. This was Just such a Case, and the Ship must have returned half loaded, if the Master had no power to make such a Contract.

4. This cargo was shipt subject to a pledge to the plfs., to whom the Bill of Lading was endorsed by the Charterer. The plfs. therefore were the Shippers & owners of that part of the Cargo, & entitled to demand possess. of it free of freight.

Judgt for plf.

The great importance of the above case has compelled me to be more minute than I wished; but otherwise you could not have understood it, & even now, the course of reasoning, filling near 15 or 16 folio pages, is not & could not be stated without tiring both yours & my patience.

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Lessee of Wright vs. Scott. Devise "to my well beloved & only daughter, Eliz. Wright, and to her husband J.W. of all my estate real & personal, to them, their heirs begotten of their bodies or assigns forever, or for want of such heirs, or assigns, then to the heirs begotten by or of either of them, & to their assigns for ever, all which estate is given as a portion to my sd daughter." decided that these words passed to Eliza. & her husband a Joint estate in fee last, notwithstanding the words underscored, with a remainder, upon their dying without issue of their bodies, to the survivor and the heirs of the body of such survivor, by any other husband or wife. This is the only construction by which the manifest intention of the Testator can be made to harmonize with the rules of Law. (There were many other difficult questions in the cause, which depending upon the laws of N. Jersey, I forbear to state).

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Harrison vs. Rowan. Mot[ion] for a new trial of the issue devisavit val non, directed by this Court sitting in Equity, & tried by a special Jury at the last term of this Court who found in favor of the will. The grounds were

1. Because the jury were furnished with refreshments by the innkeeper where they were confined, either on their request, or on the mere good will of the Innkeeper, which the successful party paid for, proved by the affidavits of some of the Jury & the innkeeper.

2. upon the affidavit of one of the Jurymen, that he did not assent to the verdict; but that after the Jury came into Court and stated their disagreement & were sent out again, that Juryman agreed that the verdict might be rendered; but that if they were polled, he should state his dissent, They returned— on being polled, he stated his dissent, and were again sent out. After being together he agreed to the verdict & on being a second time polled he answered in the affirmative.

3. The value of the property, & that the inheritance ought not to be bound by one verdict.

It appearing that the refreshments were not furnished at the request of the successful party, nor with his knowledge, and that he paid his general bill, without knowing that a charge for them was included in it, the first ground was overruled— as to the second, affidavits of Jurymen showing their disatisfaction with the verdict, to which they publickly assented in Court, & where no deception was practiced by the other Jurymen, or by any other person, ought never to be admitted to set aside the verdict. But even the facts stated under this head, if otherwise proved, are not sufficient to set aside the verdict. The 3d ground is not sufficient, nor is it supported upon authority.

But the Court which tries the issue ought to be satisfied with the verdict; & the Dist. Judge not feeling so satisfied in this case, the other Judge agreed to direct a notice of the issue.

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Lessee of Bayard vs. Colefax &c. Eject[ment] against 3 defts in poss. who entered an appearance, confessed lease entry & ouster, & plead Jointly. a demurrer to the Evid. was taken & Joined, which stated, amongst other things, that at the time of the service of the declaration, the deft C. was in possess. of part of the premises in dispute, holding the same in Severalty, & that S., the other deft, was in possess. of another part, holding the same in Severalty. It was objected that the possessions of the defts being several, a Joint action in Eject., can't be maintained agt them. opinion— Where 2 persons, holding distinct possessions in Severalty of the premises mentioned in the declaration, are united in the same declaration, & Jointly enter into the Common rule & plead Jointly, Judgt may be given against them separately, if their separate possess. are found by the Jury, or are stated in a demurrer to Evidence— See 5 Johns. 278. (There were many other difficult points in the cause, which depended upon the State laws).

Thus, my dear Sir, greatly to my own relief, &, I am persuaded to yours, I have gone through such of the cases as would bear abbreviating, or were of a general nature. many others were decided which, on account of the extent & intricacy of the evidence—or their dependence on State laws, are necessarily omitted. Penns vs. Kirk took a fortnight, exclusive of Sundays which would not admit of abridgement. others were tedious Equity causes, which for the same reason are omitted.

I shall be anxious to recieve your report, in which there is always something new, & instructive. With best wishes for your health and happiness I am truly yr affect. & faithful friend