“Libel of seizure founded on the Slave Trade Act of 20th of April 1818, ch. 86; the act of 22d March 1794, ch. 11; and the act of 10th May 1800, ch. 51. At the trial the only count, which was sustained by the evidence, was founded on the first section of the act of 1800, ch. 51.

Indictment for making a false declaration as to the employ­ment of a vessel in the cod fisheries, contrary to the act of Congress of the 29th of July, 1813, ch. 34, §§ 7 and 9.

“This was a proceeding in the District Court, under the 10th section of the act of 21st of February 1793, ch. 11, to repeal a patent right, granted to the defendant, upon the allegation, that it was obtained surreptitiously and upon false suggestion.

“Information or libel of seizure for importing into Boston, from the province of New Brunswick, certain coal, which was not truly goods or merchandise of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the said province, contrary to the act of 15 May 1820, ch. 122, § 3. At the trial, the principal inquiry was, whether the coal was the produce of the province of New Brunswick; and the evidence on both sides was so contradictory, that the question, on whom the burthen of proof rested, became the turning point of the cause.”

“The present is a joint indictment against the prisoners for murder [onboard the schooner Fairy out of Boston]. They have severally pleaded not guilty. And a motion has now been made in writing, in behalf of one John D. White, otherwise called Charles Marchant, that he may be tried separately; and this he claims, as a matter of right. The motion is resisted on the part of the District Attorney for the United States, who utterly denies, that there exists any such right in law; and the parties are now before us upon the mere matter of right.

“The question, which comes before us upon a certificate of a division of opinion of the judges of the Circuit Court of Massachusetts, is this, whether two or more persons, jointly charged in the same indictment with a capital offence, have a right, by the laws of the country, to be tried severally, separately, and apart, the counsel for the United States objecting thereto, or whether it is a matter to be allowed in the discretion of the Court.

“Indictments for the murder of Edward Selfridge, on the high seas, on the 28th of August, 1826. Plea, not guilty. After a verdict of guilty, Jarvis and Dunlap, counsel for the prisoner, moved in arrest of judgment, and also for a new trial, because no copy of the indictment was furnished two days before the prisoner’s arraignment and pleading, according to the statutes of 1790, eft. 9, § 29. The motions were argued at length by them, and replied to by Blake, District Attorney, for the United States.”

“Indictment on the second and third sections of the Act of 20th of April, 1818, ch. 86, against the slave trade. There were various counts in the indictment, but that which was principally relied on, was for causing a certain vessel, called the Science, to sail from the port of New York, for the purpose of procuring negroes, &c. from Africa, to be transported and held, sold and disposed of as slaves. At the trial the cause turned principally on questions of fact.”

“Debt for the penalty of 500 dollars against the defendant, master of a coasting vessel, for suffering the locks and fastenings, put on the hatches of the vessel, by an inspector of the customs, to be broken, contrary to the 54th section of the Revenue Collection Act of 2d of March, 1799, ch. 128. The defendant pleaded nil debet, on which issue was joined.

“Assumpsit with the common money counts. The defendant pleaded in bar of the action the statute of limitations of the State of New-York, where the contract was made, to which the plaintiffs demurred. The question raised in the present case, is whether the limitation act of the state, where a contract is made, shall govern the decision of this court, sitting in another state, in which judicial proceedings are instituted for the purpose of enforcing the contract.”