“This was a writ of error from the District Court of Maine. The action was brought by the United States as indorsees of a promissory note made by the defendants at Eastport on the 10th of February, 1826, whereby for value received they promised to pay the president, directors, and company of the bank of Passamaquoddy or order, three months after date, the sum of twenty-three hundred and thirty-three dollars and thirty-three cents; and afterwards the bank, by its cashier, indorsed the same to the United States.

“Assumpsit on a policy of insurance of 2500 dollars on the schooner Warren, at and from Philadelphia to Alvarado, valued at 2500 dollars. Loss averred to be total by perils of the seas. 2. Count, on a policy of 1200 dollars on the freight on board of the same vessel, valued at 1200 dollars. Loss averred to be total in like manner. 3. Count, money had and received. Plea, the general issue.”

“Libel on information of seizure for a violation of the Coasting Act of 1793, ch. 8, and the Revenue Act of 1799, ch. 128. At the trial at October Term, 1821, the acts of illicit trade being proved to be in Passamaquoddy Bay, the principal question was, whether they were done within the territorial limits of the United States, or within the British waters.

“This was a writ of error from the judgment of the District Court. The original action was assumpsit for money bad and received, brought by the United States against the defendant in error, as administrator of the estate of Col. John L. Tuttle, deceased. The defendant pleaded, 1. The general statute of limitations of Massachusetts, (substantially like the statute of 21 Jac. ch. 16, § 3,) to personal actions; 2. the statute of Massachusetts, limiting suits against executors and administrators to four years after the acceptance of the trust; 3.

“This was a proceeding in the District Court, under the 10th section of the act of 21st of February 1793, ch. 11, to repeal a patent right, granted to the defendant, upon the allegation, that it was obtained surreptitiously and upon false suggestion.

“The present is a joint indictment against the prisoners for murder [onboard the schooner Fairy out of Boston]. They have severally pleaded not guilty. And a motion has now been made in writing, in behalf of one John D. White, otherwise called Charles Marchant, that he may be tried separately; and this he claims, as a matter of right. The motion is resisted on the part of the District Attorney for the United States, who utterly denies, that there exists any such right in law; and the parties are now before us upon the mere matter of right.

“Indictments for the murder of Edward Selfridge, on the high seas, on the 28th of August, 1826. Plea, not guilty. After a verdict of guilty, Jarvis and Dunlap, counsel for the prisoner, moved in arrest of judgment, and also for a new trial, because no copy of the indictment was furnished two days before the prisoner’s arraignment and pleading, according to the statutes of 1790, eft. 9, § 29. The motions were argued at length by them, and replied to by Blake, District Attorney, for the United States.”

“Indictment on the second and third sections of the Act of 20th of April, 1818, ch. 86, against the slave trade. There were various counts in the indictment, but that which was principally relied on, was for causing a certain vessel, called the Science, to sail from the port of New York, for the purpose of procuring negroes, &c. from Africa, to be transported and held, sold and disposed of as slaves. At the trial the cause turned principally on questions of fact.”

“Debt for the penalty of 500 dollars against the defendant, master of a coasting vessel, for suffering the locks and fastenings, put on the hatches of the vessel, by an inspector of the customs, to be broken, contrary to the 54th section of the Revenue Collection Act of 2d of March, 1799, ch. 128. The defendant pleaded nil debet, on which issue was joined.

“Assumpsit with the common money counts. The defendant pleaded in bar of the action the statute of limitations of the State of New-York, where the contract was made, to which the plaintiffs demurred. The question raised in the present case, is whether the limitation act of the state, where a contract is made, shall govern the decision of this court, sitting in another state, in which judicial proceedings are instituted for the purpose of enforcing the contract.”